GCI MEMO to UNFCCC [Short Version] 28th February 2012

Responding to Decisions taken at COP-17 [December 2011]

Calling for suggestions on 'increased ambition' 'ensuring highest effort by all parties'.

The full length version is at: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/GCI_to_UNFCCC_and_Movie_.pdf



 $FCCC_{/CP/2011/L.10}$



Framework Convention on Climate Change

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- 1. Decides to extend the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention for one year in order for it to continue its work and reach the agreed outcome pursuant to decision 1/CP.13 (Bali Action Plan) through decisions adopted by the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth sessions of the Conference of the Parties, at which time the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention shall be terminated;
- 2. Also decides to launch a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or a legal outcome under the Convention applicable to all Parties, through a subsidiary body under the Convention hereby established and to be known as the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action;
- 3. Further decides that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action shall start its work as a matter of urgency in the first half of 2012 and shall report to future sessions of the Conference of the Parties on the progress of its work;
- 4. Decides that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action shall complete its work as early as possible but no later than 2015 in order to adopt this protocol, legal instrument or legal outcome at the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties and for it to come into effect and be implemented from 2020;
- 5. Also decides that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action shall plan its work in the first half of 2012, including, inter alia, on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, transparency of action, and support and capacity-building, drawing upon submissions from Parties and relevant technical, social and economic information and expertise;
- 6. Further decides that the process shall raise the level of ambition and shall be informed, inter alia, by the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the outcomes of the 2013–2015 review and the work of the subsidiary bodies;
- 7. Decides to launch a workplan on enhancing mitigation ambition to identify and to explore options for a range of actions that can close the ambition gap with a view to ensuring the highest possible mitigation efforts by all Parties;
- 8. Requests Parties and observer organizations to submit by 28 February 2012 their views on options and ways for further increasing the level of ambition and decides to hold an in-session workshop at the first negotiating session in 2012 to consider options and ways for increasing ambition and possible further actions.

Inclusive global rationale for UNFCCC-compliance needed now.

The raised ambition level called for at COP-17 by the UNFCCC Parties and Executive requires that we now demonstrate and quantify an inclusive global rationale - or constitution - to achieve the objective of the Convention i.e. 'UNFCCC-compliance'.

Contraction & Convergence [C&C] 'Inevitably required' for UNFCCC-compliance.

The objective of the UNFCCC is safe and stable Greenhouse Gas concentration in the global atmosphere. As the cost of failure is incalculable, in a measured and time-dependent way, we must 'do-enough, soon-enough' to quantify, arrange and then achieve compliance' with that objective. C&C is a rational calculating model, but also a 'negotiating mechanism' to do just that. However, before it is a 'flow-process', C&C is a 'stock-concept'. It is non-random and logical. As such it has been called 'An Incontestable Truth' by an All-Party Group of UK MPs [See note 8]. The UNFCCC Executive took the position at COP-9 in 2004 saying C&C is 'inevitably required' for UNFCCC-compliance [See note 1].

C&C integrates two primary issues needed for this; it now has much support.

C&C was first proposed to COP-2 UNFCCC in 1996 by GCI. The purpose is to help UNFCCC negotiators integrate, quantify and reconcile the two primary issues they are still faced with, to achieve 'climate-justice without vengeance'. It is offered again now, along with some of the support that it has generated since then. The depth and diversity of this support is now very considerable [See note 8].

[1] **Contraction:** The 1st issue is to quantify the full-term global greenhouse emissions contraction-event that is inevitably required for UNFCCC-compliance. For reasons of 'urgency', the question is what 'path-integral' [full-term, rate, carbon-weight, date] of the global emissions contraction-event do we jointly need to estimate and agree is needed for UNFCCC-compliance? Another way of asking this, is how much carbon consumption is still 'safe' globally', if dangerous rates of climate change are to be avoided? We must be guided by the need to solve this problem faster than we are creating it.

Empirically, estimating the global emissions contraction-event is primarily a science-based judgement. So here the UNFCCC is largely dependent on the IPCC's estimates of 'climate-sensitivity' and global monitoring of source, sinks and stocks of Greenhouse Gases [GHG] that are active in the Earth's climate system. As all we can control are GHG from human sources, C&C pays particular attention to those.

[2] **Convergence:** The 2nd issue is to resolve the question arising as to how we integrate and internationally share that contraction-event in a rational and transparent manner. An international convergence of shares under a global contraction-event is inevitable. So the key question here is how will this sharing arrangement of permissible future 'emissions-rights' come about? Will it result from [a] random guesswork [b] a better-intentioned network [c] a continuing aspirational

patchwork [d] or now finally adopting the 'constitution' of C&C's rational and inclusive framework?

Politically, this is a primarily an equal-rights-based judgement and therefore a constitutional issue. C&C assumes that, as any defence of unequal rights will lack support internationally, equal rights is the only logically defensible position, politically.

International Shares must sum to no more than total of Contraction-Event

However, the shares or emissions-rights arising are rational fractions of the contraction-event needed for UNFCCC-compliance. Shares must sum to no more than the total weight of emission-rights available under that contraction-event. This is a logical - and not an ideological - requirement. So, possibly with a population base-year being chosen for the accounts, all shares for all Countries [or Regions of Countries] result from an accounting procedure that calculates how shares result from an international convergence on the global per capita average of consumption arising under the contraction-event chosen for UNFCCC-compliance. As a first order argument, this is the incontestable truth of C&C. There are no contestable ideological assumptions or economic computations in the model whatsoever.

Logic precedes contestable economic computations & ideological assumptions

Attempting to calculate global UNFCCC-compliance any other way, is to remain stuck in the contestable ideological assumptions and economic computations that have bedevilled the negotiations for the last twenty years. This ideological dead-lock has made consensus impossible and these computations and assumptions have made UNFCCC-compliance, unquantifiable, un-negotiable and unachievable.

C&C, Historic Responsibilities & the 'Main Equity Lever'.

Inequity attends the 'historic responsibility' for causing climate change with emission accumulated in the atmosphere since 1800. To redress this & offset the future opportunity cost to fossil-fuel-based development in developing countries, the 'main equity-lever' is negotiating a rate of convergence that is significantly accelerated relative to the rate of contraction [Prof Ross Garnaut].

Accelerated Convergence - 'Emissions Entitlements' are not 'Emissions per se'.

As the Chinese Government has stressed, since global carbon-trading requires that the 'emissions entitlements' are tradable these are necessarily different from emissions per se. The faster the convergence rate is relative to the contraction-rate, the more the 'equity-share' is transferred from the accounts of those consuming carbon above the global per capita average to the accounts of those consuming carbon below that average. So under-consumers have a mechanism with which to leverage their position 'at the expense of over-consumers', while - crucially - all remain subject to the contraction rate, weight & date agreed for UNFCCC-compliance. The question is what rate of convergence [fast/slow] relative to the contraction rate agreed, can the international negotiations bear?

Turn Kyoto's 'market-based framework' into C&C's 'framework-based-market'.

Integrated this way, C&C turns Kyoto's aspirational 'Market-Based-Framework' into a rational 'Framework-Based-Market'. Agreeing the rates of C&C is the primary task and this is primarily the task for UNFCCC negotiators. This approach does not preclude additional side-agreements of any kind.

Making Regional Groupings makes negotiating headline rates of C&C easier.

GCI does not presume to prescribe what the rates of C&C must be. GCI's role has simply been to demonstrate [quantify & visualize] linking the range of contraction-rates examined in the global 'science-debate' to the convergence-rates involved in the international 'policy-debate' [see note 3]. However, GCI feels it would certainly facilitate policy negotiations if India and China [& others] grouped together as regions in the way for example the EU acts as a region, as this would remove intra-regional negotiations from the COPs to the UNFCCC and negotiations would be more 'strategic'.

C&C & a negotiating example, based on what happened at COP-15.

At COP-15 in December 2009, the UK was part of a group of Governments that *prescribed* the rates of C&C that are in the UK Climate Act [see 4]. They prescribed that convergence to globally equal per capita shares should complete by the year 2050, but by when 80% of the available carbon budget was used up.

Right principle prescribing wrong rates at COP-15: negotiate rates at COP-18.

This was the right principle but *prescribing* the rates was a mistake. Moreover, it was prescribed at rates that were unacceptable to the majority [see note 5] & it was rejected by the non-annex One countries. Understanding this reason for that failure and correcting it is key to any future success.

Already in July 2009 the Chinese Government wrote that those rates of C&C were acceptable for per capita emissions per se, but for equal per capita emissions-rights or 'emissions-entitlements', they were looking for a 'global climate deal' with immediate convergence, rather than the gradual convergence over a 40 year period to 2050, by when 80% by weight of the global emissions-budget would have been used up [see note 6]. Negotiators now need to close the 'convergence-gap' between now and 2050.


It is crucial to note that technically with 'emissions-trading' these two positions are quite compatible. Politically, the 'gap' between them can better be resolved through more clearly quantified negotiations, than with more opaque 'prescriptions' by sets of Governments, complicated by 'lobbying' from sector interests loaded with contestable economic computations and ideological assumptions.

Negotiating Convergence Rate: 2010, 2020, 2030, 2040, [COP-15 prescribed 2050].


The intervening positions on the rate of convergence, with weight and value [\$100/tonne] are as below and were calculated of the model runs shown in the graphics that follow on the next two pages.

Convergence by Year	eight of Carbon Rights transferred to LDCs in Billions Tonnes Carbon [Gt C] Value of Carbon Rights transferred to L		
2010	50 Gt C	\$5.0 trillion	
2020	40 Gt C	\$4.0 trillion	
2030	29 Gt C	\$2.9 trillion	
2040	16 Gt C	\$1.6 trillion	
2045	8 Gt C	\$0.8 trillion	

Developing Countries Start Negotiating from Here



Convergence by 2040 to Globally Equal Per Capita Emissions Entitlements



Developed Countries Start Negotiating from Here

NOTES

[1] C&C 'Inevitably required': http://www.gci.org.uk/C&C Janos Pasztor UNFCCC.pdf

[2] High Level Statement, Asian Development Bank, Manila June 2009

"The framework of contraction and convergence provides a flexible methodology to address the problem of allocation of emission rights. The contraction of overall world emissions pursued along with the convergence of countries' average per capita emissions, allows developing countries to partake of the carbon budget. The per capita entitlements approach is an effective one in that it takes into account historical responsibility and is based on the egalitarian distribution of the commons, within which international justice positions of causal responsibility such as the 'polluter pays principle,' come in."

Ursula Schäefer-Preuss - Vice President of ADB.

Haruhiko Kuroda - President and Chair ADB Board.

Ban Ki-moon - Secretary General of the United Nations.

Rajendra Pachauri - Director of TERI, Chair IPCC.

Yvo de Boer - Former Executive Secretary UNFCCC.

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo - President Philippines.

Zhou Dadi - Chief advisor national energy strategy, People's Republic of China.

Full Signatory List of over thirty eminent people: - http://www.gci.org.uk/endorsements_UN_Bodies_ADB_Signatories.html

[3] Rates of C&C: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/rates.html

[4] C&C in UK Climate Act

http://www.gci.org.uk/endorsements_UK_Climate_Act.html

[5] C&C - Right Principle & correcting Wrong Rates projected COP-15. http://www.gci.org.uk/animations/COP_15_C&C.swf [6] Chinese Government accepted the C&C Principle July 2009 with 'their' rates "Since the principle of 'contraction and convergence' was first proposed by the Global Commons Institute in 2000, it has been widely embraced by some industrialised countries. Under contraction and convergence, each country will start out with emission entitlements equal to its current real emissions levels, and then, over time, converge to equal its per capita entitlements, while the overall global budget contracts to accommodate the emissions reduction objective. The convergence principle should be applied immediately rather than later as the 'converged point' in the future. 'Real emissions' is a different concept to 'emissions entitlement'. A country's high/low per capita real emissions cannot justify its high/low emission entitlements. In the process of convergence, the rights and interests of country B are really infringed by country A. In the NEA-based solution, the concept of convergence can still be incorporated, but it now merely means 'convergence of real emissions' rather than 'convergence of emission entitlements'. Each country's gaps between its emission entitlements and real emissions need to be balanced by the traded emissions quotas."

Greenhouse gas emissions reduction - a theoretical framework & global solution Development Research Centre of the State Council People's Republic of China 2009

http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/China_Research.pdf

- [7] Seeking a negotiation to 'correct' rates of C&C see opposite and here: http://www.candcfoundation.com/pages/whatis.html
- [8] General endorsements of C&C after 20 years http://www.gci.org.uk/endorsements.html

UN Bodies	UK Climate Act	Institutions	Medics	Religious
Population	Ethics	Equity	Sustainability	Sceptics
Campaigns	Individuals	Academia	Capital/Social	Law
Economics	Politics	Justice	Publications	All

http://www.gci.org.uk/news.html

[9] C&C Foundation: -

http://www.candcfoundation.com/index.html

[10] C&C Foundation: -