
GLOBAL COMMONS INSTITUTE

7th September, 2011

Julie-Anne Richards International Policy Coordinator Climate Action Network - International 1810 16th St. NW, Washington, DC 20009, USA



Dear Julie

Contraction and Convergence [C&C] in the CAN-I 'Fair Effort Sharing Discussion Paper'

Thank you for your letter of the 7th of September 2011 in connection with the above. Thank you too for confirming that CAN-I has a meeting Monday 12th about the 'Fair Effort' discussion and that the matters I raise with you here again will be raised at that meeting. Specifically these matters are: -

[1] accurately representing how GCI - as its author - defined the C&C mechanism: - http://www.gci.org.uk/Briefings/ICE.pdf

[2] distinguishing between that and 'third party opinions about that', as for example in: - http://climatenetwork.org/sites/default/files/CAN_effort_sharing_discussion_paper_25July2011_v2.pdf

From the outset in 1990, GCI's purpose with C&C has been to help UNFCCC negotiators by providing a calculating model - a 'negotiating mechanism' - to resolve the two primary issues they are faced with as they work towards defining, agreeing and achieving UNFCCC-compliance. GCI simply notes that: -

[1] a global greenhouse emissions C&C-event is inevitably required [see 1] for UNFCCC-compliance, so the question for reasons of 'urgency', is what path-integral - i.e. full-term, rate, weight, date - of emissions contraction do they jointly need to agree to achieve UNFCCC-compliance [i.e. how much carbon consumption is still 'safe' globally, and so how much do we all still have to share between us?].

[2] a convergence on the global per capita average arising under contraction [with or without a population base-year] creating international shares is arithmetically *inevitable*, so the question for reasons of 'equity', is what rate of *convergence* [fast to slow] relative to the contraction rate agreed, can the international negotiations bear, noting we can only share what we jointly have, and not what we don't.

[3] the faster the convergence rate is relative to the contraction-rate, the more the 'equity-share' is transferred from the accounts of those consuming carbon above the global per capita average to the accounts of those consuming carbon below that average. So for reasons of 'historical responsibility' [see 2], under-consumers have a mechanism with which to leverage their position 'at the expense of over-consumers', while all remain subject to the contraction rate agreed for UNFCCC-compliance.

Like this C&C is just a unifying tool for negotiating UNFCCC compliance. It doesn't preclude whatever additional side-payments can be agreed. Agreeing these rates is the primary job and it is primarily a job for the negotiators. GCI does not presume to prescribe to them what the rates must be. GCI has simply demonstrated [quantified & visualized] the linking of the range of contraction-rates discussed in the 'science-debate' to the convergence-rates inevitably involved in the 'policy-debate' [see 3].

In 2009 the UK Government was part of a group of governments that prescribed the rates of C&C in the UK Climate Act [see 4], at COP-15 in December 2009. However, this was the right principle at the wrong rates [see 5] and it was rejected by the non-annex One countries. The reason for this is key.

In 2009 the Chinese Government wrote that those rates of C&C were acceptable for per capita emissions per se, but for per capita 'emissions-entitlements' they were looking for a 'global climate deal' with immediate convergence rather than the gradual convergence over a 40 year period to 2050 by when 80% by weight of the global emissions-budget would have been used up [see 6]. Technically with 'emissions-trading', these two positions are not incompatible. Politically, the 'gap' will be resolved through more clearly quantified negotiation, than 'prescription' and 'lobbying' by sector interests.

For their benefit but specifically for your meeting on Monday, I have attached overleaf: -

- [1] references for these positions identified above with
- [2] a clear and quantified demonstration of them and how the gap between them can be closed.


Thank you again for your help as I repeat my request that the CAN-I discussion paper is revised to reflect the points made above, so its point about C&C and 'historical responsibility' is corrected.


With kind regards Your sincerely

Aubray Meyer
Aubrey Meyer
Director GCI
cc general

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
Chinese Government Position








Negotiating Positions in Between Chinese and UK Governments




UK Government Position



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[1] C&C 'Inevitably required':-

http://www.gci.org.uk/C&C_Janos_Pasztor_UNFCCC.pdf



[2] High Level Statement, Asian Development Bank, Manila June 2009

"The framework of contraction and convergence provides a flexible methodology to address the problem of allocation of emission rights. The contraction of overall world emissions pursued along with the convergence of countries' average per capita emissions, allows developing countries to partake of the carbon budget. The per capita entitlements approach is an effective one in that **it takes into account historical responsibility** and is based on the egalitarian distribution of the commons, within which international justice positions of causal responsibility such as the 'polluter pays principle,' come in."

Ursula Schäefer-Preuss - Vice President of ADB.

Haruhiko Kuroda - President and Chair ADB Board.

Ban Ki-moon - Secretary General of the United Nations.

Rajendra Pachauri - Director of TERI, Chair IPCC.

Yvo de Boer - Former Executive Secretary UNFCCC.

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo - President Philippines.

Zhou Dadi - Chief advisor national energy strategy, People's Republic of China.

Full Signatory List of over thirty eminent people: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/endorsements_UN_Bodies_ADB_Signatories.html

[3] Rates of C&C: -

http://www.gci.org.uk/rates.html

[4] C&C in UK Climate Act

http://www.gci.org.uk/endorsements UK Climate Act.html

[5] C&C, the Right Principle & how to correct the Wrong Rates that were rejected COP-15.

http://www.gci.org.uk/public/COP_15_C&C.swf

[6] Chinese Government accepted the C&C Principle July 2009 but at 'their' rates

"Since the principle of 'contraction and convergence' was first proposed by the Global Commons Institute in 2000, it has been widely embraced by some industrialised countries. Under contraction and convergence, each country will start out with emission entitlements equal to its current real emissions levels, and then, over time, converge to equal its per capita entitlements, while the overall global budget contracts to accommodate the emissions reduction objective. The convergence principle should be applied immediately rather than later as the 'converged point' in the future. 'Real emissions' is a different concept to 'emissions entitlement'. A country's high/low per capita real emissions cannot justify its high/low emission entitlements. In the process of convergence, the rights and interests of country B are really infringed by country A. In the NEA-based solution, the concept of convergence can still be incorporated, but it now merely means 'convergence of real emissions' rather than 'convergence of emission entitlements'. Each country's gaps between its emission entitlements and real emissions need to be balanced by the traded emissions quotas."

Greenhouse gas emissions reduction - a theoretical framework and global solution Development Research Centre of the State Council People's Republic of China 2009

http://www.gci.org.uk/Documents/China_Research.pdf

[7] Seeking a negotiation to 'correct' rates of C&C - see opposite and here: -

http://www.candcfoundation.com/pages/whatis.html

[8] General endorsements of C&C after 20 years

http://www.gci.org.uk/endorsements.html