The shape of civil society to come

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This report is one in a set of three
Futures for civil society (summary)
The shape of civil society to come
Scenarios for civil society
www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk
To use the social capital jargon – diversity might mean that like ‘bond’ with like but to develop effective social capital these individuals and groups also need to ‘bridge’ or connect to other groups (multi-faith forums) and ‘link’ to power (state and market).

Peter Steiner, The New Yorker, 5 July, 1993 (Vol. 69 (LXIX) no. 20)

In the pre-internet era Jonathan Raban explored this idea in his influential book Soft City (1974).

The term ‘digital natives’ was popularised by the games developer and consultant Marc Prensky. The metaphor of ‘immigrants’ and ‘natives’ was also used by other writers during the 1990s, such as John Perry Barlow and Douglas Rushkoff. See www.marcprensky.com/blog/archives/000045.html for Prensky’s discussion of the origin of the term.

www.cheese-rolling.co.uk (accessed 2 August 2007)

Within a narrative, there are often feedback loops in which, for example, “consequence” reinforce trends, and there are often connections between the different stories within each wheel.

It should be added that the futures’ wheels which follow in this section represent an attempt to synthesise the futures’ discussions that were held in each of the six drivers’ workshops. Inevitably they create an impression of greater order than the discussions in the workshops.


This report documents the findings of a series of futures events held by the Inquiry into the Future of Civil Society in the UK and Ireland. The purpose of these interactive events has been to help the Inquiry focus on the most ‘burning issues’ facing civil society, looking out to 2025.

One of the reasons for having conversations about the future is to understand the present better – and differently – so that we act with foresight rather than regret with hindsight.

Many of the issues raised in this report will come as no surprise – though in practice too many are ignored. So the report looks at the prospect of widening gaps between the rich and the poor, and the risks of greater social segregation. It looks at the possible effects of an ageing population on civil society, and at the implications of continuing disengagement from traditional politics. It also looks at how climate change could affect civil society – whether by encouraging a revived localism or a much stronger sense of global responsibility. Each of these issues poses distinct and difficult challenges for civil society – not least because of the limits of its power to act relative to the big battalions of government and business.

The report also airs other issues which are only beginning to be understood – like the long-term impact of devolution on civil society, or the growing importance of diasporas.

Like all good futures exercises this one addressed not only what could happen but also what we might want to happen. The idea of civil society has always contained within it our aspirations for a good society – aspirations which continue to point in often conflicting directions, for example, with some people seeking a messy, even hedonistic pluralism and others hankering for greater social order, some welcoming ever more developed technologies and others seeing this as a road to hell.

The findings of the report draw on the inputs of many hundreds of people who shared their time and their insights in what turned out to be a fascinating series of discussions across the jurisdictions. Many of the participants in the Inquiry events commented on how helpful futures thinking can be. Few get the time to ‘look up’ and think about the likely context in which they work, and few get the chance to think hard about what different futures might mean for their organisations.

We hope that this report, which draws on the discussions, will provide a useful tool. It doesn’t offer either forecasts or prescriptions. But it does provide a seriously researched prompt that should be helpful for any organisation – or group – that wants to be prepared for the future.

That matters, because in the past, civil society has often been ahead of other sectors in warning of new threats – like those from climate change – as well as embracing new opportunities – like those from a wider understanding of human rights. Our aim with this report, and with the work in the later stages of the inquiry, is to stay ahead of the game and to help civil society shape the future rather than simply responding to events when they come.

Geoff Mulgan
Chair, Inquiry Commission
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Executive summary

In 2006, the Carnegie UK Trust launched an Inquiry into the Future of Civil Society in the UK and Ireland.

The Inquiry’s working definition of civil society has three dimensions. Civil society is understood by the Inquiry as a goal to aim for (a ‘good’ civil society), a means of achieving it (through civil society associations such as voluntary and community organisations, trade unions etc.), and a framework for engaging with each other about ends and means (arenas for public deliberation).

To better understand what might be the future threats to and opportunities for civil society in the UK and Ireland, looking out to 2025, the Inquiry applied futures thinking. With support from Henley Centre HeadlightVision, the Inquiry hosted a number of futures events across the UK and Ireland, gathering insights from over 400 individuals with diverse professional and life experiences.

This report documents the findings of the Inquiry events that explored the drivers of change that are likely to shape the future nature and role of civil society, looking out to 2025. Drivers of change are forces (social, technological, economic, environmental, political, organisational or legal) that may affect civil society, for good or for bad.

The purpose of futures work is to ‘disturb the present’ and to help organisations understand and manage uncertainties and ambiguities. Futures thinking operates on an assumption that there is not one future but multiple possible futures, dependent partly on how we choose to respond to or create change. We can influence the future through our actions and our choices, even if many dimensions of the future are outside of our direct control. Exploring the extent to which we can affect change depends on our understanding of the drivers of change.

Participants in the Inquiry events prioritised which drivers of change will likely have the most significant impact on civil society. Figure 1 overleaf lists the prioritised drivers and organises them accordingly in to three categories.

The first category represents contexts. These are important but largely certain drivers over which civil society associations have little influence (yet civil society associations will need to respond to them). The second category are those drivers which present the greatest uncertainties for civil society. These drivers of change are variable, and can therefore be influenced by the actions of civil society associations. The uncertain drivers have been clustered into the following headings:

- Limits of economics (such as growing socio-economic divides and pressure on global resources)
- Personal values (such as rising individualism and shifting identities)
- Shifting activism (such as disengagement with formal politics and the rise of ‘digital natives’)
- State and individual (such as the visibility of the security state and the regulation of civil life)

The third and final category of drivers of change are those which represent outcomes of some of the contextual and/or uncertain drivers (such as the increasing complexity of family structures and the ‘professionalisation’ of third sector organisations).
Having identified the key drivers of change for civil society, participants in the Inquiry futures events explored how the drivers of change might affect civil society in the future. The analysis of these insights led to the development of nine faultlines that present significant challenges or opportunities for civil society:

**The challenge of sustainability.** Participants in Inquiry events were clearly concerned about the growing pressure on global resources and the associated threat this may have on civil society as the ‘good’ society. While environmental activism has put new energy into some parts of civil society, there is a question about how the sustainability agenda or the so-called ‘green value shift’ will shape the nature of civil society associations and their relationships with the state and the business sector (who are critical players in tackling climate change at a local and global level).

**Growing isolation of the poorest.** There is a strong sense from the Inquiry events that economic polarisation between the rich and the poor and the associated growing social divides are likely to significantly affect civil society. The challenge for civil society associations is to support and to empower the most marginalised and not to replicate inequalities in their own structures. A second challenge is to find different ways of articulating outcomes that are not based on paradigms of economic growth or market delivery. For example, the burgeoning well-being literature has a more holistic approach to measuring success.

**Social cohesion under pressure.** In addition to fears that society will further fragment along socio-economic grounds, there is a notion that increased cultural and religious diversity may lead to fragmentation of civil society. There are a number of challenges this faultline presents, including how a secular state engages with strong value-based communities (such as faith-based organisations), and how civil society associations best act as mediators or brokers between individuals/organisations/sectors etc.
Shifting activism and increasing obstacles to engaging with civil society. A number of obstacles seem to stand in the way of active participation in civil society. Time and the pressure of work was a common theme across the Inquiry events. Regulatory barriers, such as health and safety regulations, were also of concern to participants, especially the impact they have on small-scale civil society associations whose actions may be inhibited by their lack of capacity to deal with them. The perceptions of diminishing and/or commercialisation of ‘spaces’ (whether they be physical or virtual) for deliberation also surfaced as possible obstacles or threats to active participation. Freedom to express oneself and the space in which to do so was highlighted as a key foundation stone for a healthy civil society. The increasing importance of non-institutional or less formal forms of civil society associations were highlighted by participants, questioning whether they will replace or supplement more traditional or ‘organised’ forms of civil society associations.

Traditional political engagement on the wane. Many of the discussions at the Inquiry events highlighted the decrease in participation in formal politics and the changing relationships between civil society associations and formal structures of representative democracy. The challenge to civil society is how it might connect formal and informal democratic processes.

Application of technology. The application of technology has great strengths and has energised many parts of civil society, increasing the ability of associations to broaden their scope and the richness of connections. It was also seen as a good organising tool for collective action. However, technology was also seen by participants in the Inquiry workshops as a source of fragmentation and atomisation. Civil society associations will inevitably review the way in which they apply technology given the rise of the ‘digital natives’.

Voluntary and community associations lose their distinctiveness. Increasing partnership with the state, for example in the delivery of public services, has brought with it demands for accountability and performance. To achieve this, participants in the Inquiry events noted that civil society associations have often imported governance models from outside to improve delivery and productivity. Participants felt that attention needed to be given to supporting diverse forms of organisational models and practice to ensure civil society is strong. It was also felt that homogeneous models of management should be avoided.

Diminishing arenas for public deliberation. One of the most common themes from throughout the Inquiry events concerned the underlying weakness of the arenas for public deliberation. These arenas have been eroded by a number of trends such as the declining engagement in formal politics, the concentration of ownership of traditional media, the privatisation of public spaces and the interpretation of the burgeoning number of laws about security and disorder.

Marginalisation of dissent. Participants raised concerns about the marginalisation of dissent in the UK and Ireland, especially in relation to those that lack the power or confidence to voice their concerns or those who have non-mainstream views. It was also noted that any restrictions in civil liberties in the UK and Ireland, for example in the name of security, can have significant detrimental affects on civil society in other parts of the world. For example, in less democratic countries civil society activists can be imprisoned and labelled as ‘extremists’ under the cloak of anti-terror legislation.

What now? Drawing on the findings of the Inquiry’s futures work, the Inquiry Commission will identify a number of ‘burning issues’ to explore in further depth in 2008. The second phase of the Inquiry will draw back to the present and identify how policy and practice might be enhanced in the near-term so as to better take advantage of emerging opportunities or diminish possible threats for civil society.
Introduction

In 2006, the Carnegie UK Trust launched an Inquiry into the Future of Civil Society in the UK and Ireland. Informed by an Inquiry Commission, chaired by Geoff Mulgan, and supported by an International Advisory Group, the goals of the Inquiry are to:

- Explore the possible threats to and opportunities for the development of a healthy civil society, looking out to 2025
- Identify how policy and practice can be enhanced to help strengthen civil society
- Enhance the ability of civil society associations to prepare for the challenges of the future.

The Inquiry working definition of civil society has three dimensions. Civil society is understood by the Inquiry as a goal to aim for (a ‘good’ civil society), a means of achieving it (through civil society associations such as voluntary and community organisations, trade unions etc.), and a framework for engaging with each other about ends and means (arenas for public deliberation).

Given the vast scale and scope of civil society, the Inquiry has split its work into two phases.

Phase one of the Inquiry

The purpose of the first phase of the Inquiry was to identify and explore possible future threats to and opportunities for the development of a healthy civil society, looking out to 2025. To help achieve this goal, the Carnegie UK Trust commissioned Henley Centre HeadlightVision (HCHLV) an organisation that has experience of applying futures thinking.

Using futures techniques, HCHLV and the Carnegie UK Trust:

- Undertook research to identify the key drivers of change that are likely to affect civil society (this primarily involved drawing on HCHLV’s extensive database of social, technological, economic, environmental and political forces for change).
- Held a series of futures workshops across the UK and Ireland for the purpose of gathering insights about what the future might hold. Around 400 people with diverse professional and life experiences participated in these events. Appendix 3 lists the individuals that contributed to the Inquiry’s futures events Individual reports from each of the Inquiry events are available on the Inquiry website (www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk).
- Conducted semi-structured interviews with key informants.

There are two reports that summarise the findings of the first phase of the Inquiry’s work. This report outlines the analysis of the drivers of change that are likely to affect the future nature and role of civil society, looking out to 2025. A second complementary report describes a number of scenarios that are both plausible and challenging, illustrating what the future might hold for civil society.

Both reports are designed not only to inform the second and final stage of the Inquiry’s work, but to stimulate further deliberation about the future of civil society in the UK and Ireland.
What next? Phase two of the Inquiry

Drawing on the findings of the first phase of the Inquiry, the Inquiry Commission will identify a number of ‘burning issues’ to explore in further depth in 2008. The second phase of the Inquiry will draw back to the present and identify how policy and practice might be enhanced in the near-term so as to better take advantage of emerging opportunities or diminish possible threats for civil society.

Andrew Siddall – civic Architects Ltd
What is civil society?

Civil society is clearly a contested concept. For the purpose of the Inquiry, the working definition of civil society draws on the work of Michael Edwards1 and has the following three dimensions:

Civil Society as **associational life**. Civil society is the ‘space’ of organised activity not undertaken by either the government or for-private-profit business. It includes formal and informal associations such as: voluntary and community organisations, trade unions, faith-based organisations, co-operatives and mutuals, political parties, professional and business associations, philanthropic organisations, informal citizen groups and social movements. Participation in or membership of such organisations is voluntary in nature.

Civil Society as the **‘good’ society**. The term civil society is often used as a short-hand for the type of society we want to live in and can therefore be viewed in normative terms. It is often assumed that civil society is a good thing, but this is not necessarily true. For example, civil society associations can help strengthen democracy and improve the well-being of deprived communities as can they undermine human rights and preach intolerance and violence. The Inquiry is therefore especially concerned about the strength of civil society associations as a means through which values and outcomes such as non-violence, non-discrimination, democracy, mutuality and social justice are nurtured and achieved; and as a means through which public policy dilemmas are resolved in ways that are just, effective and democratic. The actions of civil society associations alone cannot achieve a ‘good’ civil society. A ‘good’ civil society is dependent on the outcomes of and relationships between government, statutory agencies, the business sector and media.

Civil Society as **arenas for public deliberation**. Civil society is the ‘space’ in which societal differences, social problems, public policy, government action and matters of community and cultural identity are developed and debated. These public spaces might be physical in nature, such as community centres or conference facilities, or virtual, such as blogs. We may never share a common vision about what a ‘good’ society might look like and how it might be achieved, but we can be committed to a process that allows people of all ages and backgrounds to share in defining how the different visions are reconciled.

To summarise, civil society is a goal to aim for (a ‘good’ society), a means to achieve it (associational life), and a framework for engaging with each other about ends and means (arenas for deliberation).

Civil society today

This report focuses on exploring possible futures for civil society. However, by means of introduction, the section below gives a flavour of the current state and nature of civil society today.
Civil society as associational life

The associational dimension of civil society is understood broadly as the space for organised activity not undertaken by either the state or the market. The health of civil society is often understood in quantitative terms – the numbers of voluntary and community organisations, membership of trade unions etc. In this sense, civil society can be described as being relatively strong, especially in relation to the numbers of voluntary and community organisations. It is, however, worth noting that not all types of civil society associations necessarily identify themselves as being part of civil society (for example some trade unions). Furthermore, there can frequently be a blurring of boundaries between civil society associations, the market and the state (as in the case of cooperatives or social enterprises).

The **voluntary and community sector (VCS)** in the UK has expanded rapidly in recent years. July 2005 saw 169,247 active general charities in the UK, an increase of over 50,000 from 1995. Formal volunteering is also on the increase. Figures from a Home Office survey estimate that 42% of the population formally volunteered at least once in the period 2003-04, an increase from 39% in 2001. In addition, there has been an increasing involvement of the VCS in the delivery of public services. This has expanded funding streams and the potential scope for VCS activity.

Regular volunteering in the Republic of Ireland has increased recently to approximately 23% of the population. In Ireland, the voluntary and community sectors have had a long history in the delivery of key welfare services and since the 1990s the state has become the main funder of community development groups. The VCS is also included in the national level social partnership processes that include employers, trade unions, farmers and government. The inclusion of the VCS in the Irish social partnership model is its distinguishing feature although there are concerns regarding the exclusion of certain groups (for instance, there is no minority ethnic or migrant led umbrella group included).

The changing shape and role of the VCS presents both opportunities and challenges. The ‘professionalisation’ of the sector is a common theme across Ireland and the UK. Partnership with the state has brought to the fore issues around governance, namely transparency and accountability. The rise of the outcome mantra is also placing increasing demands on voluntary and community organisations to demonstrate the results of their work.

There are a number of questions that are often posed in relation to the current state and nature of the sector. One key question is; to what extent does funding erode independence and/or autonomy? The fear for some is that the distinctiveness of some organisations within the VCS will be slowly eroded. The importation of models and practices from the business and/or public sector, the increasing pressure from funding sources for efficiency drives and to professionalise might mean the VCS expands in both size and role by winning more contracts, but at what cost to the fundamental characteristics and distinctiveness of the sector?

**Faith-based organisations (FBOs)** have long played a key role in civil society. Faith-based organisations are seen as repositories and transmitters of social values. In addition, they are embedded in many hard to reach communities and their human and material resources can be important contributions to community development.

“Where and if people get involved, it’s much more for individual reasons rather than for the betterment of the community or the group. Instead, people ask if it will look good on their resumé, or contribute to another skill set – self-advancement is something people are very conscious of today.”

Comment from interviewee
The number of charities in the UK registered by faith in 2006 was 23,832 (Charity Commission). Over half of these were engaged in grant giving and roughly a third were involved in service provision. The total income for UK FBOs in 2006 was £4.6 billion. These figures underestimate the contribution of FBOs to civil society; for example there are 16,000 parish churches within the Church of England alone, many of these will be involved in civil society activity but will not be registered with the Charity Commission.

Data often illustrates a strong correlation between religious practice and volunteering. However, a recent report by the National Council for Voluntary Organisations shows that religious affiliation makes little difference to either volunteering or civic engagement.5

Data on faith based organisations in Ireland is limited, faith groups have played a huge role in the history of Irish voluntary activity. However it has been found that there is a declining presence of faith within community development despite their traditional involvement in establishing and managing organisations.6

Although the contribution of faith to civil society has received increasing attention in recent years it remains under-researched. Increasing diversity of faiths in the UK and Ireland (especially as a result of migration) and the involvement of FBOs in public service delivery is likely to motivate further research.

The relationship between trade unions and civil society is by no means straightforward. Trade unions occupy the terrain that straddles the market, the state and civil society. Although primarily work place actors, trade union activity has often seen them as key players in national corporatist governance structures across Europe and as key players within civil society.

Debates on trade unionism in Ireland and the UK have focused on declining membership and influence in recent years. In both countries the density of trade union members in the workforce has fallen, from 54% (1980) to 29% (2007) in the UK and from 63.5% (1980) to 43% (2004) in Ireland. Overall membership levels in Ireland have not actually decreased, just the percentage of the workforce that is in union membership. For the Irish unions, this is because they have been largely unsuccessful in organising workers in the expanding sectors of the economy.
In the UK membership numbers have stabilised in recent years after the dramatic falls witnessed in the 1980s and 1990s. Trade unions have made recent organising attempts to recruit members in the ‘new’ knowledge economy. The average union member in the UK is now female and professional illustrating how far from the male blue collar stereotype the union movement has come.

In times of diminishing influence, much debate has focused on (re)defining trade union identity in a changing world. For many trade union members the labour market they work in is global and so they share an agenda with other civil society associations (social movements and global non-governmental organisations) who are seeking ways to (re)regulate the global market given the inability or unwillingness of nation states to regulate national economies to the extent they once did.

This implies that trade union solidarity now needs to extend globally, a difficult task for unions that were once so entrenched in particular national systems and therefore have very different histories and modus operandi.

Similarly to trade unions, mutual aid and cooperative associations are not strictly separate from the market. Credit unions and cooperatives came into being in response to the failure of the market to provide quality goods and services universally. Although the VCS and many mutuals and cooperatives may have similar aims, to address shortcomings in housing for instance, the divergence in model and practice has often seen them portrayed as distinct from each other. In Ireland, in particular, credit unions as a form of mutual aid have long played a key role in community development.

Mutuals operate across a number of areas; agriculture, retailing, housing, health, education, childcare, community development and financial services to name but a few. In addition, Community Interest Companies have been created by the government in the UK. These new forms of mutualism reinvent and add to the identity of more traditional forms.

Although the UK has experienced a decline in the market share of retail cooperatives, the de-mutualisation of many insurers, the decline of friendly society insurers and the switch of many building societies to shareholder controlled banks, it would be wrong to assume mutuals are in decline. Membership of mutuals in the UK is estimated to be in the region of 30 million. Mutuals have a turnover of £25 billion and employ at least 250,000 people.

Phileanthropic organisations. It is estimated that there are approximately 9,000 grant making foundations in the UK that provide around £2 billion annually. In Ireland the profile of foundations is less straightforward. Many service providing voluntary organisations call themselves foundations even though they lack the basic characteristics normally associated with a foundation (such as grant-making).

One of the key roles of foundations is to complement the role of the state; acting where government is unwilling or unable. Increasingly it is becoming difficult for foundations to identify what areas of activity are complementing state activity and what areas are substituting for state activity. In the UK privatisation of service provision within the public sector, often to VCS organisations, confuses this boundary.

As with many of the associations within civil society, new forms of philanthropy are being developed such as community foundations and venture philanthropy. In part, this is being driven by the increasing interest in engaging high-net-worth individuals or corporations in philanthropic endeavours.
Non-institutional forms of civil society also challenge the notion of associational life. Increasingly we are witnessing the growth of loosely tied individuals and or coalitions of groups that eschew formal organisation. The development of technology, especially information and communication technology, has enabled and facilitated these non-institutionalised forms of civil society. Often these groupings are oppositional, single issue and fluid.

Civil society associations are often assumed to be a ‘good’ thing in themselves. However, there are a number of issues that challenge this assumption. First there is the question of impact. Increasingly, the ability of civil society associations to affect positive social outcomes is being brought into question given the lack of evidence in relation to the results of their work. Secondly, there is increasing awareness of the ‘shadow side’ of civil society. ‘Civil society everywhere is a bewildering array of the good, the bad and the outright bizarre… Recognising that people in any society associate and work together to advance nefarious as well as worthy ends is critical to demystifying the concept of civil society.’

Civil society as the ‘good’ society

What is the good society? How can it be defined? From the outset it is important to acknowledge the pluralism of perspectives that exist within civil society over what constitutes the good society. This plurality is manifest in the diversity of associations, diverse both in aims and methods, which co-exist within civil society. This section does not attempt to define what the ‘good society’ is. What is good for one group or individual is not always good for another. However, there are a number of indicators that suggest that civil society is far from ‘good’ for many people in the UK and Ireland, especially in relation to the values and outcomes of social justice, equality and non-discrimination.

In many ways we live in a world that our predecessors could not have imagined; they would be stunned by the plenty that surrounds us. In economic and material terms we live in an era of unparalleled affluence. In the last 30 years the size of our economy has almost doubled, home-ownership is at an all time high, educational achievements are higher than ever before, but are we living in a ‘good’ society?

Material prosperity does not necessarily mean increasing perceptions of well-being. In addition, the distribution of material prosperity is by no means uniform or fair. Comparisons with the past illustrate how much has been achieved in absolute terms, but relative poverty is important to perceptions of well-being.

With growing affluence we have become a more unequal and divided society. The gap between rich and poor continues to grow unabated. The rise in inequality, since 1980, reversed the previous trend of the twentieth century towards a more egalitarian society. Social mobility has also decreased. If you are born poor you are now more likely to stay poor. Around 25% of the British population lives in poverty, both in terms of income poverty and multiple deprivations of necessities.
Education is often cited as a key vehicle for social mobility but the strong link between family income and educational achievement illustrates how increasing national affluence does not automatically create a good society. Only 9% of graduates come from the poorest 20% of families whereas 47% of graduates come from the richest 20%.12

Employment is also often cited as a route out of poverty, however half of the children living in poverty today in the UK live in households where low pay rather than unemployment is the cause of their poverty. This issue has been a salient one in London where unions and community groups have campaigned for a ‘living wage’. Outsourcing, privatisations, insecure employment contracts and downward pressure on pay have all hit the poorest workers in Britain the hardest. The short-term contracts and casualised labour of the flexible employment market have shifted the burden of risk – costs of education, training, ill health, being made redundant – from businesses and state to the individual.13

Time poverty is another symptom of workplace changes. British men work the longest hours in Europe and job satisfaction has fallen sharply in the 1990s. This has reduced the time available for working people to spend with their families and/or pursue their own well being agenda and even to engage with civil society. Work related stress has become a major health issue.

Children growing up in the United Kingdom are exposed to more risks from alcohol, drugs and unsafe sex and suffer greater deprivation than those in any other wealthy country in the world, according to a study from UNICEF. This report showed that the UK is at the bottom of the league of 21 economically advanced countries in terms of the well-being of children and adolescents (even though child poverty has been reduced in the UK, from 25% to 15% in the past decade14).

By applying a normative lens to civil society and exploring notions of the ‘good society’, it is evident that civil society associations alone do not have the resources, capabilities or indeed the legitimacy to create the ‘good’ civil society. Other agents of change such as the market, governments or powerful individuals are critical to enhancing the well-being of people and the environment in which we live. The nature of the relationship between all these agents of change is therefore critical to working towards a ‘good’ society in which outcomes of equality, non-discrimination and social justice are achieved.
The arenas for public deliberation

Arenas for deliberation are formal and informal ‘spaces’ that enable individuals and associations with diverse and potentially opposing views to come together to debate the means and ends of civil society.

Formal spaces might include village halls. Informal spaces, such as pubs, parks or local shops also provide platforms for deliberation.

New technology has opened up infinite possibilities for the ‘connected’ to create and participate in virtual forums for deliberations. How open and public these are depends on how many people have, and are able to use, the technology.

New technology allows individuals and groups to connect across enormous geographical space; the potential for expanding the public arena is potentially endless. However, relationships in these environments are different to relationships conducted face to face; there are questions as to whether these virtual relationships can engender trust and other forms of social capital.

Like it or not the technology is here to stay. Social networking sites are popular and proliferating. They are potentially an excellent organisational tool for civil society activity. Technology can connect individuals to advocacy, campaigns, volunteering opportunities and to each other. A key question is whether civil society associations can harness the technology for its own ends.

Traditional media consumption is declining and can only partially be described as a vehicle for deliberation and debate. Structural forces, particularly the growth of commercial mass media, have resulted in newspapers and broadcast media becoming more of a commodity than a tool for public discourse.

Governments can create public spaces. They can ensure that open public spaces are designed and built but they also create more formal consultative and decision-making forums at all levels for the public to engage and participate. However, the quality, design and availability of these types of public space vary from place to place. There is growing concern, especially in deprived urban areas, about the availability and quality of public spaces.

The Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE) suggest that well designed public spaces have been either vanishing or neglected due to the lack of resources of local authorities and the fact that developers are no longer locally organised but are often national or international companies lacking local interest and/or cultural knowledge. There are fears concerning the availability and changing nature of physical open public spaces. Privatisation or public-private partnerships often mean the spaces that appear open and public are actually not publicly owned or controlled.

Risk aversion is also an important theme in any discussion of public space. Health and safety legislation, security legislation and increasingly stringent insurance regulations all, to an extent, stifle spontaneity. The quasi-public spaces, privately owned spaces, have their own regulations that can impede legitimate organised and/or spontaneous civil activity.
Looking out to 2025

Applying futures techniques

To better understand the possible future threats to and opportunities for civil society, looking out to 2025, the Inquiry applied futures methodologies (most notably scenario thinking).

One of the central ideas in futures studies and practice, is that there are multiple possible futures. Futures thinking seeks to identify possible futures which are coherent and plausible from among the many thousands of alternative futures which could be imagined. One of the techniques used to do this involves identifying the drivers of change which are most significant, and also those which are likely to be most uncertain, which could potentially act as ‘tipping points’ into different futures. Drivers are major forces or trends that will shape the future of civil society, for good or for bad.

Organisations use futures techniques because they help them to plan for the future under circumstances of uncertainty, ambiguity, and unpredictability (for example, Shell pioneered this approach). In this, they can be contrasted with the conventional strategic planning approach, which aims to identify a single ‘fixed point forecast’, and manage towards that, albeit with frequent adjustments. The benefits of futures-based approaches are generally described as creating organisations and networks which are more responsive to changing external conditions, and more adaptable.

We can influence the future through our actions. In the words of an emblematic quote about the nature of futures work, from the French pioneer Gaston Berger ‘The purpose of looking at the future is to disturb the present’. We know we cannot predict the future. However a better understanding of what the future might hold can help civil society associations prepare for the future and influence change.

Inquiry futures workshops

To inform the work of the Inquiry, the Carnegie UK Trust hosted 11 futures events throughout the UK and Ireland, to which it invited people with diverse professional and life experiences (see Appendix 2 for participant list).

Futures work consists of many differing tools and techniques. But in general, these can be regarded as clustering into four distinctive stages described below and illustrated in Figure 2.

The first of these is ‘scanning’, when the external landscape is reviewed broadly for changes in drivers which may affect the way in which civil society in its three dimensions behaves or is organised.

An initial set of around 50 drivers of change was developed by Henley Centre HeadlightVision, in response to the scoping question: ‘How will civil society change between now and 2025?’ These drivers were based on a number of sources: Henley’s internal database, emerging trends and issues, insight from a series of structured interviews with experts on civil society, and broad desk analysis and research. Participants in the Inquiry events were able to develop the list to reflect the specifics of the local contexts by adding potential drivers. In each workshop participants initially scanned...
through these drivers in order to identify those that are most likely to affect the future nature and role of civil society. A full list of drivers can be found in Appendix 2. The drivers which were prioritised are listed in Table 1.

The second stage of futures work involves ‘understanding’. In this stage, drivers of change are prioritised so as to understand which will have the greatest impact on civil society, and which are most uncertain.

Once the list of drivers had been scanned by participants in the Inquiry events, they were then asked to group the prioritised drivers into clusters. This activity helps to understand how different drivers might be linked together.

Figure 2: The cycle of futures work

The third stage involves ‘interpreting’ the range of possible futures deriving from the drivers which have been identified in the first two stages. In the case of the Inquiry, a technique called a ‘futures wheel’ was applied, the results of which are illustrated in a later chapter of this report.

The fourth stage of the cycle involves ‘implementing’. This entails changing the way in which organisations think and act so as to be better prepared for the future. The findings of this report relate mostly to the first three stages of this cycle. However, the faultlines described at the end of this report and the complementary scenarios report have been developed so as to stimulate deliberation about changes that civil society associations might need to make to prepare for the future.

Because workshops were held in the five jurisdictions in the UK and Ireland, this gave us a valuable opportunity to test both for commonalities and differences between the jurisdictions. Although the commonalities were broadly far greater than the differences, what was striking about the differences was the degree to which they reflected structural social and institutional issues within the jurisdictions, and the way these were expressed through the political system. This was especially the case in the jurisdictions that had experienced devolution. Reports summarising findings from each of the Inquiry workshops are available on the Inquiry website (www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk).
Looking out to 2025

Table 1: The prioritised list of drivers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Rising individualism**       | The majority of UK citizens now believe that the best route to raising standards for everyone is to “look after ourselves” rather than “look after the community’s interests.”  
15.4 million Britons holidayed alone in 2005, up from 9.6 million a decade ago. |
| **Increasing importance of well-being** | Over 80% of consumers consider family, friends and education/knowledge a source of pride, compared to 57% for wealth.  
“It’s time we admitted that there’s more to life than money, and it’s time we focused not just on GDP, but on GWB – General Well-Being”  
David Cameron, Conservative Leader, UK |
| **Ageing population**          | In the UK, there are already more people aged over 60 than under 16. By 2025 there will be more over 60s than under 25s.  
Life expectancy in the UK has risen from 76 years for men and 81 years for women in 1981, to 80 years for men and 83 years for women today. By 2026, this is projected to rise to 84 years and 87 years for men and women respectively. |
| **Increasing complexity of family structures** | More than one fifth of dependent children in the UK now live in lone parent families, double the figure for 1981.  
Mothers head 9 out of 10 single-parent households.  
40% of marriages now end up breaking down. In 1958, 95% of children lived with both of their birth parents but now the figure has dropped to 65%. |
| **Increasing migration**       | Net in-migration to the UK increased from 265,000 in 1993 to 513,000 in 2002.  
The number of British citizens who chose to emigrate permanently abroad doubled from 53,000 in 2001 to 107,000 last year – some 2,000 people a week. |
| **Increasing cultural and religious diversity** | Black and minority ethnic groups (BME) comprised 7.9% of the UK population in 2001, up from 6.6% a decade earlier. In some inner city areas in England, people from BME communities now comprise more than 50% of the population. |
| **Shifting sense of identity (identities)** | Few people see themselves as simply ‘British’ or ‘English’ but have more complex and fluid senses of identity based on factors including education level, ethnicity, religion and even a ‘virtual’ persona. |

Continued overleaf.
### Political

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shift from uni-polar world to multi-polar world</strong></td>
<td>The emergence of new economies in the ‘South’ means that multilateral agreements are having to be renegotiated. The stalemate over the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Doha round over US and European agricultural subsidies, with opposition led by China, is one example.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rising disengagement from formal politics</strong></td>
<td>In Ireland, the three general elections with lowest turnout have been the last three. In the UK, two of the three lowest turnouts have been in the last ten years. In Ireland, party membership fell by a quarter between 1980 and 2000. In the UK, party membership fell by a half in the same period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rise of single issue politics</strong></td>
<td>Engagement with single issue and identity-based politics is increasing – and therefore having an increasing impact on formal political processes (from Countryside Alliance to the campaign against Trident, especially strong in Scotland).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increasing visibility of the security state</strong></td>
<td>In recent years, the government has introduced increasingly stringent laws on terror. In 2005, the limit on holding terrorism suspects was increased from 14 to 28 days, although the government is still calling for this to be extended further to up to 90 days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Growth of the surveillance state</strong></td>
<td>The UK has the densest concentration of CCTV (closed circuit television) cameras in the world. The number of CCTV cameras in Britain has increased from 100,000 in 1997 to 4 million in 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increased regulation of civic life</strong></td>
<td>Since May 2004, UK employers must obtain “enhanced” CRB (Criminal Record Bureau) checks for people looking to work in schools for the first time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increasing importance of rights agenda</strong></td>
<td>Human rights issues continue to generate much political debate and discussion. For example, David Cameron recently proposed scrapping the 1998 Human Rights Act, arguing instead for a Bill of Rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increasing role and influence of devolved government</strong></td>
<td>The National Assembly for Wales is implementing an increasing number of policies and laws which distinguish it from the rest of the UK. For example, Welsh at GCSE is compulsory, there are no longer tuition fees for Welsh people going to university, and prescription charges have been scrapped.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1: The prioritised list of drivers continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technological</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Falling cost of technologies</strong></td>
<td>Technology continues to double its processing capacity for a given price every eighteen months – as predicted by Moore’s ‘law’. This may slow in around 2013/2014 when it reaches physical limits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rise of pervasive technologies</strong></td>
<td>“It would seem that science fiction is slowly turning into science fact in an ‘Internet of Things’ based on ubiquitous network connectivity…”</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Today, in the 2000s, we are heading into a new era of ubiquity, where the ‘users’ of the internet will be counted in billions and where humans may become the minority as generators and receivers of traffic.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rise of ‘digital natives’</strong></td>
<td>The average youth spends 23 hours a week online and 67% of youngsters say they would be “lost” without their PC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social scientists identify a new generation of ‘digital natives’, now in their early twenties, who have grown up surrounded by digital and networked communications and media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shift from media consumption to media production</strong></td>
<td>A blog is created every 3 seconds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social media sites such as Flickr (photos), YouTube (video) and MySpace (social networking, but increasingly also music) are among the fastest growing on the web.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environmental</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increasing pressure on global resources</strong></td>
<td>The ‘ecological footprint’ of the planet is now greater than one, and it continues to increase. The UK’s footprint is 3.1. In other words, we are using up more resources than the planet can replenish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Scientific consensus on human-created climate change</strong></td>
<td>There is now scientific consensus that climate change effects are created by human activity. The reports from the IPCC (Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change) are becoming more pessimistic about climate change outcomes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increasing private and public response to climate change</strong></td>
<td>72% of UK citizens feel that they should be doing more to protect the environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65% of UK citizens think that industries/companies are most at fault for causing climate change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When asked who is most responsible for tackling climate change, 39% say the government and 22% industries/companies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued overleaf.
Table 1: The prioritised list of drivers continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Growing socio-economic inequalities</strong></td>
<td>By 2010, it is estimated that the UK’s richest 10% will own 30% of total household income, whilst the bottom 10% will have only 3%. This compares to figures of 24% and 3.5% in 1996.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increasing concentration of corporate power</strong></td>
<td>Mergers and acquisitions continue to increase concentration within economic sectors. At the same time, the financial sector is becoming increasingly influential in restructuring economies and defining corporate agendas. This has created some political response from citizens (e.g. Tescopoly.com)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increasingly fluid working patterns</strong></td>
<td>In 1994, 47% of employees worked ‘flexibly’ (i.e. part-time/job-share/home-work). By 2004 this had risen to 57%. Increasing numbers of employees take ‘career breaks’ or ‘gaps’ while in work.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increasing role of Third Sector in public sector delivery</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increasing professionalisation of the third sector</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Understanding the drivers of change

To identify the most important and uncertain drivers of change, Henley Centre HeadlightVision (HCHLV) used a structuring tool known as an impact matrix which helps to understand the relationships between the drivers, and their impact on civil society between now and 2025 (the conceptual framework for this matrix was developed by the French futurist Michel Godet). The benefit of this process is two-fold. It helps to separate out those drivers which are certain and form the context in which civil society will unfold, and those which civil society actors can seek to influence. The future is not pre-determined; parts of it do respond to our actions. One of the benefits of futures work is that it helps us to tell which drivers are open to our influence, and which are not.

As illustrated in Table 2 (overleaf), the matrix structure enabled HCHLV to pull apart drivers which represent contexts (important but largely certain) from those which are also important but represent uncertainties. It also enables the identification of drivers which are outcomes of the uncertain drivers. Any actions taken by civil society actors assume that they will have to respond to the context setting drivers but will not be able to influence them. The uncertainties represent those drivers that are variable and therefore can be influenced.

Focusing only on the important and uncertain drivers in the middle column, these can be clustered into four themes explored below and illustrated in Figure 3.

- The limits of economics
- Personal values
- Shifting activism
- The state and the individual

**Figure 3: Schematic of prioritised drivers**

Source: Henley Centre HeadlightVision
Table 2: Summary of impact matrix output

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contexts</th>
<th>Uncertainties</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Falling cost of technologies</td>
<td>• Rise of pervasive technologies</td>
<td>• Increasing complexity of family structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increasing migration</td>
<td>• Rising individualism</td>
<td>• From media consumption to media production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Shift from uni-polar world to multi-polar world</td>
<td>• Rising disengagement from formal politics</td>
<td>• Growth of the surveillance state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ageing population</td>
<td>• Increasing importance of rights agenda</td>
<td>• Third sector as public service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increasing role of devolved government</td>
<td>• Increasing corporate power</td>
<td>• Professionalisation of third sector organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Scientific consensus on climate change</td>
<td>• Increasing cultural and religious diversity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Growing socio-economic inequalities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Shifting sense of identity (identities)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Private/public response to climate change</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rise of single issue politics</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increasing importance of well-being</td>
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<td>• Increasing visibility of security state</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Increasing regulation of civic life</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Rise of ‘digital natives’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increasingly fluid working patterns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increasing pressure on global resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The contextual drivers should, overall, come as little surprise.

The fall in the cost of all aspects of technology, from processing power to memory to distribution, has been one of the dominant transformational influences on society since the 1970s. It has accelerated in the last fifteen years as technology has become increasingly embedded in our personal and public lives. Historically, computing power has broadly halved in cost for the same capability every eighteen months – which represents a 16,000-fold improvement in performance in 18 years.

The litany of Britain’s (and Europe’s) ageing population is a familiar one; Britain is expected soon to become the second country in Europe, and the third in the world, to attain an average age of 40 (after Japan and Italy). It raises questions of health (although the older population is significantly healthier than their counterparts of a generation ago) and economics (as a society, how do we support an older more dependent population – or do we find ways of changing expectations about dependency?).

Migration remains a significant cultural and political force, even if it is not on the same scale as the great waves of movement seen in the second half of the 19th century. The economics of an older and more affluent workforce mean that younger migrants are increasingly necessary, whether from communities in Africa, the Caribbean and Asia which have traditionally looked to Britain, or the accession states of the European Union (EU). But the discourse about how to manage the cultural and religious diversity that results is a recurring and controversial theme, not just in the UK but across Europe.

One of the significant global contexts against which the future of civil society will play out over the next eighteen years is the evolving shift in global power, at the level of economics, politics, and diplomacy. If the ‘Cold War’ period, from the late 1940s to the late 1980s, was a period of bi-polar power (between the USA and the USSR), we have, over the last eighteen years lived through a period of uni-polar power, with America dominant. However, there are strong signs now that we are moving towards a more multi-polar world, as several centres of global power emerge. China and India, in particular, have started to extend their increasing economic power into the areas of politics and diplomacy, and the emergence of a recognisable ‘BRIC’ group (Brazil/Russia/India/China) with an agreed policy position in – for example – World Trade Organisation negotiations has been an indicator of this trend. At the same time, the EU has been increasingly willing to take a divergent position from the United States in such negotiations, and in the pursuit of international relations more generally, and this has been accelerated by disagreements over the war in Iraq and the attitude of the Bush administration towards multi-lateral negotiations on issues such as climate change, and towards organisations such as the World Bank. Looking forward we can see at least three competing centres of global influence, between the United States, the European Union, and emerging nations, most likely led by China.
The work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in reaching agreement that the recent climate change effects are a human-generated phenomenon is one of the striking achievements of the time. It is rare to find the level of scientific consensus it has achieved on the subject, although this consensus has itself created some degree of public scepticism. The result has been a significant shift in political, business, and public opinion, both nationally and internationally, which has forced even well-established climate change sceptics to change their position.

The final contextual driver of change may seem like more of a surprise in this company. The increasing role of devolved government was a strong theme of the workshops which were held in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, and was clearly changing the dynamics of civil society in those countries. Its prominence at the Inquiry events may partly be a matter of timing, since the workshop schedule straddled the 2007 elections in each of those countries, and coincided with the power-sharing agreement reached in Northern Ireland. Having tested it subsequently with stakeholders, however, it seems to reflect a longer-term trend which could re-shape many assumptions about civil society and its relationship to politics.

It is worth noting that these contexts have a similarity to the UK Treasury’s long-term strategic challenges, which are, in summary, about the impact of technology, social and demographic change, climate change, globalisation, and security. Our analysis in the next section suggests that for civil society, issues around globalisation and security play out differently than for the state.

The rise in socio-economic inequalities appears inexorable.

Uncertainties

The limits of economics

- Growing socio-economic inequalities
- Pressure on global resources
- Response to climate change
- Increasing corporate power

The limits of economics

In some ways, the drivers captured in this cluster of issues were seen as embodying one of the biggest overall uncertainties facing civil society in the next decade and a half. The rise in socio-economic inequalities appears inexorable. The latest Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report shows a further growth in the gap between the top and bottom ten percent, in Britain as elsewhere in Europe and North America. The combination of global labour markets and global capital markets conspires to reward the rich and depress the wages of the poor, at least relatively. One participant in the Inquiry events captured this memorably when they spoke about “the have-nots and the have yachts”.

A related strong theme was the notion of the “80/20” society, in which most people were comfortably off, but a bottom tier found themselves in very different economic circumstances. The fear for many of the participants in the workshops was that civil society associations are increasingly reflecting this 80/20 society. Unless the associations of civil society can engage with and legitimately represent and articulate the views of the most marginalised, civil society will be no more than a vehicle for the 80 percent in the 80/20 society.

At the same time the two sustainability trends can potentially pull in opposite directions. Global resource issues will affect companies as much as ordinary citizens. Companies, however, have more ability and motivation to respond. They are larger, and can shape their environment more. But they can respond in different ways. They can choose to
reduce their resource use by changing their business models, logistics and production systems, or they can concentrate on securing existing stocks of resources. The first is likely to align them with civil society organisations and the second to bring them into opposition with it.

This is not to say that the rise of corporate power is necessarily inimical to the welfare of civil society. It is to say instead that the way in which the corporate sector engages with this cluster of issues will potentially define the forms of civil society we see across a large range of issues, in particular those pertaining to associational life; from a tone of constructive engagement at one end to oppositionalism at the other. One of the recurring themes of the workshops and of the interviews was that the challenge of environmental sustainability was likely to be a defining feature of civil society in Britain and Ireland between now and 2025, and that it had the potential to reinvigorate civil society organisations and rebuild relationships with politics and politicians.

Sitting beneath this cluster is a further set of arguments about how we understand the purpose of the state. The long wave of economic growth since the Second World War has within it the notion that the role of the state is to increase the affluence of its citizens by fostering economic growth. More recent evidence suggests that income levels (above a relatively modest level long since passed by the UK, more recently by Ireland), have little impact on the “happiness” of citizens, or more soberly, their social well-being (the rise of the well-being agenda is discussed in the next section below).

One of the emerging issues that we’re likely to see gain in strength towards 2025 is about how the good society can be better measured in an age of extensive affluence.

**Personal values**

The nexus of drivers captured in the cluster on personal values is complex and, as with the limits to economic growth, contains sharp potential for conflict. It is also worth observing that to a significant extent this group of drivers frames the health of that part of civil society which is about associational life. They capture many of the aspects of individual and social behaviour which condition people’s ability to get involved, to associate, their willingness to do so, and the types of associations that they are likely to join.

Rising individualism has been one of the strong social trends in both Britain and Ireland for the last quarter of a century. From a British perspective, it is captured best by a famous quote from Margaret Thatcher: “there is no such thing as society”.17 Some participants in the Inquiry workshops have suggested that in response, civil society associations need to recast the way they position themselves to volunteers and/or members to respond to this greater sense of the individual self. The notion that people are volunteering, campaigning and participating to improve their employability or for other types of personal development is widely held.18

At the same time, however, other drivers in this cluster of issues suggest perhaps that this trend towards individualism may have reached its apogee. The rise of the well-being agenda, another deep and persistent trend over the last decade or more, does take on individualist expressions, but in many respects it also leads to a more holistic view of one’s world, a view that encourages engagement. Many of the requirements necessary to achieve well-being cannot be achieved through consumption; for example, the need for higher quality public spaces, better social connections within one’s local community, and so on.

Equally, the trend around flexible working – which shows signs of acceleration – also reconnects individuals with a world beyond their own interests and their work.19 Some of it is driven by care needs, for children or older parents, which in of themselves tend
to re-connect people with a local community. Some of the effect is consequential; if one spends more time working from home, one becomes more aware of one's locality and the issues which affect it. However, the question of flexibility for whom is important to address. Those with weak labour market status are less likely to be able to work flexibly on their own terms, because of their more unequal position vis-à-vis the employer.

The trends around cultural and religious diversity are more complex. At one level they can lead to fragmentation. There was a persistent theme during the Inquiry workshops that such diversity would lead to the further fragmentation of the public arena into multiple discrete public arenas; that different groups would have their own conversations in their own spaces.

Taking a longer term view, this issue can be regarded as a significant uncertainty around the future of civil society. It is impossible to tell whether in the years to 2025 this trend will deepen, so different groups become more isolated from one another. Alternatively, will multi-cultural communities and civil society associations act as a connection between different groups?

At the same time this diversity has had other, more positive effects. Diaspora communities have influenced the civil society agenda by making it more global and less national, while also becoming a significant source of aid and remittances in their own right. Diversity is widely recognised as a source of innovation, and so on. The concern remains, though, that fragmentation leads to deep links within social groups and poor links between them, which tends not to be conducive to the development of effective social capital.21

The trend towards greater cultural and religious diversity also has an individual dimension, in that it creates a greater range of cultural repertoires from which individuals can draw meaning. The notion that technology can enable us to switch roles seamlessly and quickly is well established and generally not regarded as unsettling. The internet, for example, can enable us to present discrete identities to multiple discrete audiences.

The role of the internet as a source of new channels of activism is reviewed in the following section. But in terms of personal values, it enables people, with far greater ease than in the past, to adopt ‘soft’ identities which they can choose to mould to particular circumstances.23 It may also imply less commitment to a wide range of values, roles and repertoires. The effect of this on associational life remains uncertain.

“It has taken a long time for civil society associations to catch up with the ethnic diversity of the UK population.”

Comment from interviewee

Andrew Siddall – civic Architects Ltd
Shifting activism

The third cluster of issues is about the relationship between shifting political practices, and their amplification by the emergence of new digital technologies and digital media.

The data on the disengagement from formal politics (illustrated in Table 3) is fairly conclusive, not just in the UK but across Europe. It is not represented just by falling turnouts at elections, but also, for example, by falling membership of political parties. In response, we have seen the rise of ‘NGO’ (non-governmental organisation) politics in the form of successful campaigns on single issues. NGO politics and the focus on single issues raised doubts among participants in the Inquiry events as to whether individuals are able to relate single issue interests to other interconnected policy areas. Traditional civil society associations, such as trade unions or political parties, connected their membership to multiple issues simultaneously and resolved tensions between them democratically. Other trends, such as greater individualism, have also played their part in encouraging a focus on single issues.

One of the important themes that has come through the drivers process is how to rebuild the relationship between politics and civil society. Some participants have spoken to us about the “double deficit” in terms of democracy, with weak political organisations talking to weak civil society associations. They argue that both have to be rebuilt; a strong civil society on its own is not enough. Others have argued that more effective civil society associations would create sufficient dynamic to re-energise political processes. One repeated theme at the Inquiry events was the need for a new ‘contract’ between the state and civil society – and indeed with the corporate sector in the interests of sustainability.

Table 3: Indicators of long term fall in political participation (selected European countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Change in party membership, 1980-2002 (%)</th>
<th>Years of lowest electoral turn out (1950-2003)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>3.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>5.05</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>2.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>9.66</td>
<td>4.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Peter Mair, “Ruling The Void?”, NLR 42, 2006

The development of pervasive personal technology has also been a factor in shifting activism. This can be overstated: although half of UK households have access to broadband (as at the end of 2006)\(^4\), at the same time around two-fifths of households in the UK do not have any connection to the internet, even if 90% now have a mobile phone.\(^5\) Nonetheless, it is clear that for those engaged in civil society associations the spread of technology has represented a decisive shift.

The fourth driver of change in this cluster can be thought of as the shape of things to come. The notion of the ‘digital native’ is a way to characterise the emerging cohort, now in their mid-20s, who have grown up immersed in a technological world.\(^6\) Computers, mobile phones, and games have always been a part of their lives. There is some emerging evidence that they behave in different ways, both with regard to technology and in terms of the social attitudes surrounding technology use, than older people. As with the cluster of trends around personal values, the digital natives have the potential to energise civil society – but it also carries the risk of fragmentation. It is far easier online to engage only with groups or activities which are of particular interest to you, and online networks are as likely to reinforce existing social connections as to broaden them.
The state and the individual

The final cluster of the drivers of change represent important uncertainties for the future of civil society; how the lines are drawn between the rights of the individual and the security of the state. Throughout the world the legislation which has been introduced because of the security agenda, in particular since 2001, has had the effect of curtailing the ability of activists to speak and demonstrate. This is of particular concern in relation to less democratic countries where prisoners of conscience and civil society activists are being held under anti-terrorism legislation (clearly highlighting the contentious nature of what is perceived to be an ‘extremist’).

In the UK there have been restrictions on the right to speak and to demonstrate in the environs of the House of Commons, there have also been discussions as to whether some organisations – which regard themselves as civil society associations – should be placed on the government’s list of proscribed organisations.

At the same time, the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights into British law has reinforced the ability of activists to challenge the use of state power.

The interest of the state extends beyond the security agenda. There has been a general set of trends about the increasing regulation of public organisations, often for good reasons, and civil society associations have found themselves affected by this. This is compounded as they engage increasingly heavily in the business of public service delivery.

Many civil society associations are both small and under-funded; they can have problems complying with the bureaucratic requirements about health and safety, screening of volunteers and so on, because of the additional administrative weight that these impose. One example of the consequences is that greater training is required before volunteers can start playing an effective part in their organisations, and this additional time requirement can be a barrier to participation.

“The difference between a strong and a weak, or a confident and frayed, or a safe and dangerous society, depends on the strength of civil society.”

Comment from interviewee Andrew Siddall – civic Architects Ltd
Outcome drivers are those which are identified by participants as being visible to them, and having relevance in terms of civil society, but are found through Henley Centre HeadlightVision’s analysis to be effects, not causes. They tend to be linked to one or more of the drivers of change which are important and uncertain. Their value in futures work is that they are often useful indicators of more complex changes within the overall system. By their nature, they also tend to be heterogeneous. Nonetheless, it is worth summarising these briefly here.

Two of the outcomes were clearly significant in the way that participants in the workshop process understood their organisations and their ability to act. These were the Third Sector as a public sector delivery vehicle, and the professionalisation of Third Sector organisations.

The first of these issues, around public sector delivery, perhaps affected only a minority of organisations, but was identified as a factor which could colour the way in which civil society was viewed overall. For example, there was dispute over whether an organisation which was dependent on delivery revenues from the state could fulfil the historic role of independent critique of the state. In this situation a critique of the state service provision would also imply a self-critique. Those who believed that this was not a conflict took the line that knowledge and practice in delivery made one’s critique more compelling, not less so, and that one did not necessarily lose the values that underpinned the organisation simply because one also delivered services.

The issues around ‘professionalisation’ are more complex. At one level this is a response to increasing academic specialisation and scrutiny of what civil society associations can and do achieve. Those who work in civil society associations are likely to have a relevant academic qualification, which may also exclude people who have gained experience through engagement and practice. The traditional route, of the volunteer or lay officer who applies for a paid position, is less open than it used to be. At a second level, it is about a wider public culture which is more risk-averse than it used to be, with greater emphasis on health and safety issues than there was historically. For example, one participant at an Inquiry event noted concerns that the traditional Gloucester cheese-rolling festival, with its helter-skelter chase down a steep hill, may be prevented because of concern for the safety of participants.

The position of these drivers of change within the matrix suggests that if Third Sector organisations wish to influence these, it will need to address them at a more causal level. This would be found in the uncertain drivers of change around greater regulation of civil society, and perhaps also the increasing disengagement from politics, for example. It seems clear that a wider engagement with political life, which is discussed below, would be necessary if civil society associations wish to change the terms on which it operates.

The growth of the surveillance state refers to the apparatus of surveillance (to take a simple example, the UK is now a world leader in the number of remote cameras installed on its streets). This is an outcome of the visibility of the security state, and perhaps also a broader trend about the regulation of public life.

The outcome around increasing complexity of family life emerges from a number of trends, including rising individualism, greater socio economic inequality, ageing population, and cultural diversity. It will be important to get to the heart of these if one is to understand the extent to which complexity of family life influences participation in associational life.

Finally the shift from media consumption to media production can be seen largely as an outcome of several technology trends, including the falling cost of technology, pervasive technology, and the rise of digital natives.
Interpreting the drivers of change and how they might impact civil society, looking out to 2025

The assessment of drivers of change in the previous section was concerned with developing an overall view of how they might affect civil society as a whole. However, in understanding its future, and in particular in understanding its potential weaknesses, it helps to explore particular uncertainties which could affect each of the three dimensions of civil society, and also identify where inflection points might be found. To this end HCHLV used a futures technique called a ‘futures’ wheel’ – which builds on the drivers’ analysis – to help participants in the Inquiry events explore how the drivers of change might affect the possible future nature and role of civil society, looking out to 2025.

The futures wheel is a futures tool which enables participants to link together drivers to build a causal picture of change over time. It starts from the most significant, or primary, drivers, and develops stories around the trends, consequences, and outcomes or issues which result.

The futures wheel approach can be thought of as “structured brainstorming” about emerging futures issues. At each workshop, we developed three futures’ wheels – one for each of the three dimensions of civil society. Although unique and complex futures’ stories surfaced from each workshop, it is useful here to synthesise certain common themes and stories that emerged for each dimension of civil society.

At the centre of the wheel are the three or four primary drivers which are considered to have most impact on the issue under discussion. In the second circle are the trends or secondary drivers which emerge from this. In the third circle are found the consequences or manifestations. And in the outer circle, are the issues which arise as a result, which may include policy conflicts or management issues. This is not to suggest that change is necessarily linear.28

The futures wheel technique was applied to each of the three dimensions of civil society (associational life, the ‘good’ civil society and the arenas for public deliberation). A summary of what were incredibly rich and diverse conversations is outlined below.

It is important to note that the text below reflects participant views of what might happen and not what will happen.29 Figures 4, 5, and 6 illustrate some of the conversations that took place at the Inquiry events using the futures wheel.

Civil society as associational life

Of the significant drivers for civil society as a whole, four were consistently selected by participants in the Inquiry futures events as being at the heart of associational life:

- migration (and thence diversity)
- socio-economic inequality
- the use of new media
- the increasing regulation of civil society (and specifically, how this played out in issues such as professionalisation of Third Sector organisations)

The narrative about how the continuing increase in socio-economic inequalities affects associational life suggested that inequality leads to a fragmented civil society. This might be characterised by a ‘blame culture’ where certain groups become scapegoats (such as single mothers, asylum seekers, economic migrants and the unemployed). Relative
poverty could lead to a situation where the ‘invisible’ and ‘seldom heard’ are not helped, which has implications for both the individual and for wider society.

This is a world of the ‘80/20’ society that is replicated in a ‘80/20’ civil society. But it is also a world where different classes of the poor end up pitted against each other. Parts of associational life could become confrontational rather than co-operative, and associational forms such as the street gang become more significant within these communities at the expense of more conventional civil associations, such as community groups, trade unions or political parties.

Increased migration can lead to increased diversity within communities and between communities, which could have a range of consequences. At one level, it creates new needs (and some cases, new forms of the old shared needs which migrants have when they move to a new country). This can lead either to the development of new associations, or sometimes the adaptation of existing associations.

Figure 4: Futures Wheel – Associational Life

The development of new communities of interest or identity could also lead to new energies and new types of associational life, sometimes imported, or adapted from the countries of cultural origin. Such innovation can have a range of histories. The Notting Hill Carnival, for instance, now the biggest event of its kind in Europe, developed out of the intersection of white cultural activists and black community leaders at a time when there
was far more hostility to the area’s black community than there is now. One of the consequences of digital networks is that such communities, and their associations, are also far more richly connected to other parts of their diasporas than was the case in the past, providing a global connection which can support the culture of the migrant community, and also provide a channel by which it diffuses into the cultures and traditions of the locality of which it has become a part.

The use of new media could have both positive and negative implications for associational life. It can facilitate new forms of virtual association (e.g. blogging) and the emergence of new communities of interest. New media forms allow people to rely on rapid information from a variety of different sources, which potentially lessens the power and influence of traditional forms of media, which are increasingly held by corporate interests. They also change the boundaries of civil society, enabling immediate dialogue internationally rather than just locally and nationally, enabling the rapid creation and development of global civil society groups. There are, however, risks in this story, which were explored by participants in the Inquiry events. Technology can also be divisive in terms of use and access – certain groups in society become excluded, exacerbating the issues above arising from inequality. Proliferation of virtual worlds can also lead to fragmentation, as particular interests are channelled to particular virtual groups and remain disconnected from each other.

The increasing regulation of civil society and the Third Sector’s role in public service provision raised many questions at the Inquiry events. There was a sense of division between those groups which focused largely on service provision, and those which are more advocacy-based. There was also uncertainty over how different civil society associations define themselves, particularly with the rise in numbers of hybrid state/voluntary groups/market associations. Along with regulation comes increasing requirement for compliance.

One related question, is whether the ability of civil society associations to provide an independent critique of government will be reduced. The drive towards delivery has also brought with it a homogenisation in the forms of the organisational structures of voluntary associations; they increasingly appear to ape business forms. Within this was a further question; could these parts of civil society simply fracture between a small number of very large, highly branded service-led organisations and a large number of much smaller advocacy organisations?

To summarise technology and diversity enables the potential for new forms of associational life; new roles challenge existing identities of voluntary associations and blur the lines between state and civil society; and the fragmentation of society along socio-economic and cultural/religious/ethnic lines has the potential to be replicated within the associations of civil society unless civil society can bridge these divides and associations become more inclusive.

Civil society as the ‘good’ society

The drivers which most frequently emerged at the heart of the good society futures’ wheels were:

- the increasing importance of the well-being agenda
- increasing migration/cultural diversity
- rising individualism
- increasing inequality
- resource shortages and the response to climate change
The increasing focus on well-being was seen by many participants in the Inquiry events as leading to positive social outcomes, such as the evolution of a ‘sustainability ethic’, and solutions to support a better balance between work and the rest of one’s life. The importance placed on well-being could also lead to a value shift, away from the present emphasis placed by governments on economic growth, and therefore on forms of globalisation which focus on trade.

**Figure 5: Futures Wheel – The ‘Good’ Society**

In terms of rising individualism, few of its consequences could be said to have positive effects on the construction of values around a good society; it can lead to social atomisation, declining trust in institutions, fragmenting values, and the declining sense of community. One expression of this narrative was the rise in the number of gated communities.

Increasing cultural diversity could have both positive and negative outcomes. On the one hand, as the number of minority communities increase divisions and social tensions could emerge based around the different needs and values of the various groups. What constitutes a ‘good society’ could vary greatly amongst different cultures. On the other hand, increased cultural diversity could lead to a burst of creativity and new connections between people.
It is also worth noting some of the connections between the different narratives. The innovation found in the ‘cultural diversity’ has resonances in the innovation which would follow the development of a ‘sustainability ethic’ found in the well-being story. Conflict over values emerged often in discussions at the Inquiry events and although non-violent conflict in of itself is not necessarily a bad thing, the manner of its resolution is important.

At one level, conflict over values is inevitable within any society which has a reasonable degree of freedom of expression and is undergoing a degree of social or economic change. Such conflict can be regarded as a mark of a reasonably vibrant society. However, a healthy society also has spaces in which conflicts can be resolved effectively, equitably, and without resorting to violence or suppression, which leads us to the arenas for public deliberation.

Civil society as arenas for public deliberation

At the heart of the futures wheels on ‘arenas for public deliberation’ are a set of drivers of change, which create an unstable cocktail, both on their own and in combination. These are the:

• disengagement from formal politics
• emergence of new technologies
• increase in corporate power
• visibility of the security state

The narratives developing from the disengagement from formal politics, the visibility of the security state and increasing corporate influence each have their own stories to tell. The strand around disengagement from formal politics was already a familiar story to workshop participants. But the consequences and outcomes were felt to be serious. They lead, potentially, to a gap between civil society and politics, and also between the marginalised and the political mainstream. In that gap are found, on a pessimistic reading, serious social unrest, extreme political parties and increasingly intense and unstable single issue campaigns. In such a world, the political process has become fragmented.

On a more positive reading, it creates a space for community activism which regenerates local areas even in poorer communities, and pulls politicians and political processes along behind it. It is also possible that the failure of the public arenas for deliberation challenges the legitimacy of politics, which leads to increased interest, and investment, in deliberative processes of consultation. There are some signs of this starting to happen in the UK. However, it was largely felt that the more pessimistic interpretation was more likely.

Similarly, the story about the increasing visibility of the security state and increasing corporate power could also have a strong negative trajectory. Once on this path, it is likely to accelerate. It unfolds through a narrowing of the scope of the public arena, as a result both of restrictions on public space (for example as a result of public-private partnership funding agreements which effectively privatise public spaces) and restrictions on public speech (through, at least in the UK, the plethora of security and disorder legislation). Civil society associations may need to be more effective in defending the value of the public arenas in public and political dialogue. Alternatively protest may become increasingly ‘unofficial’, as has been seen through apparently leaderless manifestations such as London’s regular Critical Mass bicycle ride or the Reclaim the Streets protests.
If these narratives seem pessimistic, there is space for some optimism in the story about new technologies. They have already created new forms of association, new channels of information, and new types of links between civil society actors. Many of the new “Web 2.0” tools, including social technologies such as Facebook, or sites which enable the sharing of digital media, such as Flickr or YouTube, gain their financial and use value through fostering social exchange, even if they are predominantly owned by large corporate interests. They are increasingly being used by civil society associations to foster public deliberation, at least among those who have digital access and the cultural confidence to use it.

The danger here is that the ease of conversation in the digital world creates many fragmented conversations in multiple arenas. This raises the challenging question for civil society of the extent to which it needs to work to protect a cohesive public space for deliberation, connecting different voices in different communities.
Faultlines – opportunities and challenges for civil society

It is clear from the analysis of the insights gathered from those that contributed to the Inquiry and from the associated research that a number of clear faultlines are emerging which could, if not addressed, challenge the health of civil society. Faultlines have the potential to open cracks in civil society or widen already existing cracks, presenting both threats and opportunities. The key question is whether civil society can meet these challenges or take action to influence the uncertain drivers of change.

The challenge of sustainability

The so called ‘green value shift’, towards more sustainable and less resource-intensive social and economic models, has been evolving since the 1960s. It represents one of the long waves of social change. It accelerated in the 1980s, as the climate change science started to be understood, and has accelerated again in the past decade, both because climate change has become a more pressing issue, and also because resources are starting, in some areas, to become visibly scarcer as a result of greater global competition for them. Civil society associations, from political parties to single issue campaigns, have been at the forefront of this shift, in promoting awareness and confronting policies which damage the environment.

The current wave of environmental activism has put new energy into some parts of civil society, both at a global and at a local level. Some participants in the Inquiry workshops saw this as inevitably continuing, and argued that civil society in its associational form would certainly benefit as a result (i.e. more people uniting to address a common purpose). And it can be argued that civil society prospers most when there is an ideological challenge to the dominant social model. However, it also seems possible that over the next two decades the role of civil society associations may change, from an oppositional model to one which is about building systems for sustainability. Given the scale of the challenge and the fact that civil society associations alone cannot resolve climate change, it is likely that there may be further blurring of the three sectors (civil society, the state and the market) in the interests of sustainable development. This transition is already being seen in some local campaigns (such as the Transition Towns movement in the south-west of England) and some global campaigns (such as Global Contraction and Convergence). Another question raised by the challenge of sustainability is who speaks in the interests of future generations?

Growing isolation of the poorest

The current cycle of globalisation continues to have a powerful in-egalitarian effect. Even governments with a commitment to mitigating this find they can, at best, only prevent inequalities from increasing. At the same time, there is greater social stratification as social mobility has declined. Across the work done for this report, there is a strong sense that this economic polarisation is likely to damage civil society in all three dimensions (associational life, the ‘good’ civil society and the arenas for public deliberation).

There are two significant challenges here, which overlap. The first is to work with these communities to help them articulate their needs and requirements so that they get heard, and ensure that resources are delivered in such a way that they are effective in building capacity, both socially and personally. This is complex, since it involves both deep-rooted political and economic issues of class, gender, and ethnicity, and also deep-seated personal issues about public and social confidence.
The second challenge is to find different ways of articulating social outcomes which are not based on paradigms of economic growth or of market delivery (which has generally failed such communities). The burgeoning well-being literature is a more holistic approach to assessing a wider range of outcomes. Civil society organisations such as the New Economics Foundation have been influential in this discourse.

Social cohesion under pressure

In addition to the fears for a fragmenting society on socio-economic grounds there is the notion that increased cultural and religious diversity is likely to lead to increased fragmentation of civil society, both in creating multiple strands of associational life and in further fragmenting the arenas for public deliberation. There has been a repeated concern throughout the Inquiry events that discrete multiple public arenas will emerge with only a limited capacity for shared discourse. One of the biggest challenges here is captured in the observation in the description early in this report of ‘the good society’, that civil society is not an unalloyed good, that civil society associations can undermine human rights and preach intolerance and violence.

Organisations which have these characteristics are perhaps more likely to emerge from communities which feel that they are under threat, that they have few opportunities for advancement, and that their political and social concerns are neither heard nor represented within society. This is often associated with ethnic-based and faith-based groups (as a look at the Home Office list of proscribed organisations suggests).31 However, this is not just a matter of ethnicity. The recent successes of the British National Party have been in communities where the poor white working class has been unrepresented by conventional politics.

At the same time, diversity is generally regarded as a source of innovation in organisations; so creating greater connections and cohesion across civil society may be a source of innovation for civil society as well.

There are two key challenges for civil society. The first relates to creating public ‘spaces’ where difference can be explored. While difference may not always be reconciled, enlarged empantheses may have positive results.

Related to this is the question of how can civil society associations ensure that a secular state with secular institutions engages with strongly value-based faith, political and ethnic communities. This is, of course, not solely the responsibility of the state. Leadership within civil society is crucial to ensuring that these groups engage in both bridging (connecting to other diverse groups) and in linking (connecting to power – state and market).

The second challenge is to strengthen links between different civil society associations, between different sectors and indeed between those with less and more power.
The increasing importance of non-institutional forms of civil society represented both a challenge and an opportunity for civil society. Recent notable successes of single issue campaigns supported by a loose network of individuals and groups have shown the potential for these types of non-hierarchical networks. The question that kept arising throughout the Inquiry workshops was whether these types of organisations were going to replace or supplement traditional forms of civil society associations. It was felt that these types of organisation allowed variable patterns of participation, both real and virtual, on a global scale. Are these more flexible forms of association of the future? They certainly make participation easier. Are traditional forms of civil society associations that normally require more committed engagement, membership or volunteering, likely to decline due to the obstacles modern life throws up, such as time poverty?

Time poverty arose as a concern in many Inquiry workshops and its likely negative impact on civil society. People’s time has been squeezed by increasing working hours (British men work the longest hours in Europe), longer journeys to work, and at a more positive level, greater engagement (for example among British men) in family life.

However, there are signs that this may be changing. Volunteering is rising up the company agenda; there is a slow rise in flexible working; older people have more time and are more active for longer; and traditional ideas about work are being eroded by notions of career breaks, often used for social purpose. At the same time, there are some arguments that participation in associations is seen by some volunteers in a more transactional way than in the past, and is used for personal development.

Active citizenship has gained increasing attention in both the UK and Ireland and is a broader concept than volunteering. Barriers to active citizenship can be both psychological and practical. The image of volunteering and/or active citizenship can be a problem; it can be perceived as too mainstream and restricted to a narrow range of activities within formal organisational settings. Lack of confidence was also thought of by participants in the Inquiry events as a barrier; this is exacerbated for individuals excluded in other areas of life; many individuals feel that organisations would not welcome them.

The perceptions of diminishing and/or the commercialisation of public spaces were also surfaced by participants as an obstacle to active citizenship. Corporate control of public space is generally thought as a more stifling environment for civil society activity than state control of space. Freedom to express oneself and the space in which to do this was noted as being a key foundation stone for a healthy civil society.

The challenge for civil society is to reduce the obstacles to participation by ensuring opportunities suit diverse lifestyles and appeal to diverse groups. In addition, the provision of public space is an important factor allowing people to come together. However, civil society alone can not create the time and space necessary for engagement to occur. The state and market also need to play their part in ensuring that people’s lives are not marked by excessive working hours and/or lack of public space making participation and engagement more difficult.
Traditional political engagement on the wane

It comes as no surprise that a majority of participants in the Inquiry events were concerned about traditional political engagement being on the wane.

A theme to surface in an Inquiry workshop in Ireland was that civil society activists tended to have a view that their brand of participatory politics was more valuable, even more virtuous, than the representative politics of parliaments and governments, and that this underlying attitude became a barrier to effective working between them.

However, participants in the Inquiry generally felt that civil society can not be a replacement for the State. This is not to say that civil society should be looking to the State to do everything, there are many things that civil society associations do that only require the State to ensure a facilitating environment. Charitable service delivery, self-help and mutualism, trade unionism and campaigning and advocacy all require a regulatory infrastructure to be provided by the State; as a minimum it follows that to ensure this infrastructure is effective civil society associations will need to engage with the State. The break-down in the relationship between the trade union movement and the British State during the 1980s and 1990s illustrates just how important the State is to determining the operating environment of civil society associations.

In addition, many of the huge challenges facing society can not be solved by the associations of civil society alone especially when the problems are the direct result of market failure and therefore the solutions require challenging market/corporate power. Increasing inequalities, climate change and the pressure on global resources all require strong States to intervene given the market is incapable of delivering solutions and the status quo will only exacerbate the problem.

The key challenge for civil society associations is to connect informal (participatory) politics to formal (representative) politics, thereby reinvigorating formal politics. A strong State and enlightened corporate actors are key allies for civil society in the pursuit of many of the solutions to the key challenges outlined in this report.

There are signs that in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland the advent of the recently devolved assemblies has improved the quality of exchange between civil society associations and the assemblies, if only because it has pushed a layer of politics to a more local level, and because – given the smaller populations involved – many of those who are engaged in such issues already have existing social relationships.

The onus for the reinvigoration of formal politics primarily lies with politicians and the formal institutions of democracy to innovate and make themselves accessible and relevant to their citizenries. Civil society associations have a key supporting role to play in this process; a role that not only strengthens the democratic process but also enables some of the key aims and objectives of civil society associations to be addressed.
Application of technology

Technology has great strengths, and it has energised many parts of civil society and increased the ability to act effectively while broadening its scope and the richness of its connections. Stories repeatedly emerged during the Inquiry workshops about the ways in which digital media had created more international connections for civil society actors. Nonetheless, across both associational life and the public arenas, technology is also seen as a source of fragmentation and potential exclusion from civil society through its own contribution to the recurring notion of the ‘two tier’ civil society. While it is possible that this problem will have reduced by 2025, it is not at all certain.

While there is no doubt that the technology offers the potential to broaden horizons and connections for individuals and groups using it, the fear expressed by participants in the Inquiry events is that there is nothing automatic in this. Technology can also be used to gravitate solely to ones’ own interests. Using technology in this way restricts rather than broadens horizons. Traditional media (television newspapers) report on a variety of issues. New media enables users to avoid issues and views that do not reflect their own opinions. This was encapsulated by the phrase ‘The Daily Me’ (rather than the Daily Mail/ Telegraph/ Mirror).

One of the recurring questions about technology (and not just about the technology of digital networks) is ‘who does not have access to this technology, and what opportunities or access does this exclude them from?’ In addition, we know from the ‘social shaping’ school of technology the extent to which the prevailing use of technologies within society is shaped by particular interests (often economic interests). Access is just one issue. Other issues include the ability to navigate, interpret information and realise the potential of the technology once access is secured.

A challenge to civil society associations is how they harness new technology in a manner that reflects their values and enables collective action and true deliberation. It would be valuable for civil society to engage with these issues more fully, to develop digital use and practices which do not fragment civil society.

Voluntary and community associations lose their distinctiveness

It is commonplace in discussions of civil society in Britain (although not so far in Ireland) that the increasing role of voluntary and community organisations in public delivery is problematic for civil society. Reasons cited include: concentration of resources in a smaller number of large organisations; a hardening of compliance conditions generally; and the difficulty this represents for civil society organisations in fulfilling their role of independent critique. That said, some organisations would argue that their engagement in delivery gives them greater credibility as critics. However, one of the consequences of this overall trend has been an increasing conformity of governance around corporate and enterprise models, which produces a similarity of practice. There is not room here for exploration of the arguments that structure shapes expression, but nonetheless it seems likely that diversity, at the level of associational life and the good society, requires diversity of organisational models.

An associated trend discussed at the Inquiry events was the increasing pressure on civil society associations (especially on voluntary and community organisations) to demonstrate results. This demand is coming primarily from funders.
Looking forward, there are a number of challenges to the voluntary and community sector. The first relates to organisational forms and challenging the assumption that effective organisations are synonymous with business practices. This may become more pronounced given the increasing emphasis on service delivery, accountability and demands for performance measurement. As noted by one participant in an Inquiry workshop who acknowledged that voluntary and community organisations “need to prove their worth”, but that it should be done on “their own terms”.

**Diminishing arenas for public deliberation**

The strongest single message to have emerged is about the underlying weakness of the arenas for public deliberation. These arenas for deliberation have been significantly eroded by a wide range of trends, which are generally well represented in this report. These include the:

- declining engagement with politics (which can give the impression that politics is withdrawing from civil society)
- increasing fragmentation of society, as a result of greater economic inequality and also greater cultural diversity
- concentration in ownership of traditional media (and, at the same time, the decline in the use of traditional media)
- privatisation of public space, through the terms on which developers and commercial corporations are permitted to build retail and leisure centres, and through the use of public-private partnership funding arrangements to finance the development of public assets such as hospitals and schools
- interpretation of the burgeoning number of laws about security and disorder

One of the aspects of all this which is most concerning is that many of the trends combine with each other to accelerate the overall effect. Corporations, for example, will attempt to use disorder legislation to stifle a legitimate public protest about the social results of their commercial activities.

There are however some countervailing trends. The increasing use of digital technology provides one of these, although it comes with risks of exclusion and fragmentation. A second countervailing trend is the general preference of the judiciary to uphold human rights law where it conflicts with security and disorder legislation. Within the UK, the presence of the BBC, the largest non-profit media organisation in the world, also represents a countervailing factor.

The balance of the analysis in this report, however, suggests that the arenas for deliberation are being reduced in both their size and their number, and, potentially, in the range of discourse which is regarded as acceptable within them. If all of the three dimensions of civil society (associational life, the “good” civil society and the arenas for public deliberation) are integral to the successful functioning of civil society overall, the size of the threat to the effective working of our public arenas could jeopardise the health of civil society overall.
Marginalisation of dissent

Dissent played a key role in the re-birth of the concept of civil society. The term civil society re-emerged to describe the various associations and movements that sprung up to challenge state communism in central and eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. From Solidarno in Poland to playwrights in the former Czechoslovakia, dissent was a key feature in civil society.

The ‘war on terror’ has changed the environment in which civil society operates in, both in the UK and Ireland but also globally. New security legislation has been introduced and can often be applied by police and other statutory law enforcement agencies regardless of terrorist threats. In addition, police appear to use the wide range of laws in creative ways to stifle freedom of expression.

Russia has introduced new restrictions on NGO activity. The law grants government officials an unprecedented level of discretion in deciding what projects or even parts of projects can be considered detrimental to Russia’s national interests. This new legislation is aimed at protecting Russian interests from foreign interventions through NGOs.

In addition, at the Inquiry workshop in the Republic of Ireland, concerns were raised about the marginalisation of dissent with special regard to the inclusion (exclusion) of groups from the national social dialogue process. Whilst not as serious as the case in Russia, it does illustrate how dissent can be marginalised rather than suppressed. Marginalised voices include: migrant communities, children, those who are not well-educated, illiterate, have poor health or lack stamina to engage, or people who are ashamed to speak out about their identity. Michael Edwards (2004) writes ‘...expecting people on the breadline to share, participate and cooperate as equals is unreasonable unless efforts are also made to ensure this is a safe and rational thing for them to do. Arguing about politics, and holding power to account, takes both energy and courage, especially when no ‘insurance’ – legal, social and financial – exists to support you when power fights back.’

At a meeting of global civil society leaders it was also noted that what happens in the West has significant implications for the rest of the world. For example, if nation-states in Europe and America bring in much more stringent security legislation (such as The Patriot Act USA, extension of detention without trial UK) then it is very difficult for civil society associations to oppose similar restrictive laws elsewhere even when the security agenda is not the key motivator. This basically gives license to regimes of all kinds to clamp down on civil society, or at least the parts of civil society it finds most problematic.

Civil society associations in the UK and Ireland therefore need to ensure that the security agenda or indeed other developments do not impact adversely on the human rights that are fundamental to the working of civil society around the world.
What now?

4

The status quo is not an option.

Looking back, in one generation alone we have seen significant changes in international relations, the global economy, communications technology and the rise in the number and voice of civil society associations throughout the world.

Looking forward, this report has illustrated that there are many forces that will change the future nature and role of civil society, for good or ill. Clearly, there is not one future, but multiple possible futures, dependent partly on how we choose to respond to or create change.

The Inquiry sought to explore the possible threats to and opportunities for civil society in the UK and Ireland, looking out to 2025. By applying futures thinking and gathering insights from over 400 people, this report and the complementary scenarios report has heightened our understanding of what the future might hold.

The challenge now is how best to focus energies so that threats are diminished and opportunities are taken advantage of. Given the scale and scope of the challenges ahead, much action may need to be collective in nature, bridging diverse civil society associations.

“Futurism is the art of reperception. It means recognising that life will change, must change, and has changed, and it suggests how and why. It shows that old perceptions have lost their validity, while new ones are possible.”

Bruce Sterling, Science Fiction Writer

For the Inquiry, drawing on the findings of the futures work, this will involve identifying a number of ‘burning issues’ that are critical to the future health of civil society. The Inquiry will focus its energy on exploring how policy and practice might be enhanced in relation to the identified burning issues during 2008.

For civil society associations more widely, we hope that the Inquiry’s futures reports and the accompanying toolkit on how to use scenarios (available on the Inquiry website) will stimulate further deliberation about how civil society associations might better prepare for and shape the future.
Appendices

Appendix 1

**Inquiry Commissioners**

Geoff Mulgan (Chair), Director, Young Foundation
George Reid (Vice-Chair), former Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament
Fareena Alam, Editor of Q News
Richard Atkinson, Archdeacon of Leicester
Millie Banerjee (ex-officio), Board member of Ofcom
Kay Carberry, Secretary of the Trade Union Congress
Rajeeb Dey, Founder and Chairman of the English Secondary Students’ Association
James Doorley, Director of the National Youth Council of Ireland
Daniel Finkelstein, Columnist and Comment Editor of The Times newspaper
Philomena de Lima, Development Officer and Researcher with University of Highlands and Islands
Seamus McAleavey, Chief Executive of the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action
Charlie McConnell (ex-officio), Chief Executive, Carnegie UK Trust
Joyce McMillan, Chief theatre critic for The Scotsman newspaper
Anna Nicholl, Policy and Campaigns Coordinator at the All Wales Refugee Council
Maeve Sherlock, Student of Theology, Durham University and former Chief Executive of the Refugee Council
Neil Sherlock, Partner in charge of public and regulatory affairs at KPMG
Jane Steele, Head of Research and Evidence at the General Teaching Council for England
Ed Vaizey, Member of Parliament for Wantage and Didcot

**International Advisory Group**

Halima Begum – Education Adviser, Department for International Development
Tom Carothers – Vice President for Studies, International Politics and Politics, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Michael Edwards – Director of the Governance and Civil Society Program, Ford Foundation
John Gaventa – Professor and Research Fellow, Institute of Development Studies
Shannon Lawder – Regional Director, Civil Society Programme for Central/Eastern Europe and Russia, C.S. Mott Foundation
Kumi Naidoo – Secretary General and Chief Executive Officer, CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
Gerry Salole – Chief Executive, European Foundation Centre

**Carnegie UK Trust Inquiry Staff**

Lenka Setkova, Director, Democracy and Civil Society Programme
Erin van der Maas, Research Analyst
Morven Masterton, Programme Coordinator
Appendix 2

Full summary list of drivers

The long list of drivers of change below was drawn from Henley Centre HeadlightVision’s database

- Growing socio-economic inequalities
- Shift from complex external identities to internal complexity
- Rising affluence
- Increasing importance of the ‘emerging’ nations
- Rising individualism
- Rising engagement with multiple communities
- Rising disenchantment with formal politics
- Rise of single issue politics
- Low levels of institutional trust
- Increasing global exposure
- Increasing migration and emigration
- Increasing cultural and religious diversity
- Rise in political extremism
- Rise in religious fundamentalism
- Increasing concern about personal privacy
- Increasing fear of crime but decreasing crime levels
- Fragmenting attitudes to public service provision
- Increasing frustration over standards of service
- Increasing role of Third Sector in public services
- Shifting channels and forms of charitable giving
- Growing expectations for corporate responsibility
- Increasing importance of public space
- Increasing private and public response to climate change
- Shift to “end of waste”
- Increasing energy costs
- Growing presence of sustainability in public policy
- Rise of the childfree household
- Blurring gender roles
- Changing household structures
- Increasing complexity of family life
- Increasing personal mobility
- Increasing value placed on personal time and energy
- Increasing importance of wellbeing
• Growth of the experience economy
• Increasingly fluid working patterns
• Ageing population
• Agelessness
• ‘Always on’ society
• Rising obesity
• Shift from media consumption to media production
• Rise of the audio-visual culture
• Rise of the digital natives
• Rise of pervasive technology
• Increased regulation of civic life
• Growth of the surveillance society
• Rising levels of mental health problems
• Falling cost of technology
• Declining audiences for mainstream media
• Growing obligations of care on families
• Increasing importance of diasporas in international aid
• Continuing importance of rights agenda
• Growing awareness of complexities of disadvantage
• Shift from uni-polar to multi-polar world
• Increasing impact of European legislation
• Increasing concentration of corporate power
• Corporations increasingly frame public agendas
• Rising importance of large-scale philanthropists
• Continuing role of media in framing public issues
• Commodification of new aspects of life
• Increasing visibility of “security state”
• Increasing global resource shortages
• Consensus on climate change
• Emergence of new measures of ‘progress’
• Fragmentation of employment arrangements
• Continuing ‘long hours’ culture
• Increasing proportion of graduates in society
• Increasing emphasis on ‘skills’
• Professionalisation of civil society
• Increased interaction and interconnection between local & globally
• Rise of Scottish independence
• Increasing cross-cultural identity
• New possibilities for identity across all dimensions
• Rise of ‘just say no’ attitude to engagement and participation
• Declining biodiversity
• Rise in numbers able to speak Welsh
• Increased role and visibility of devolved government and members
• Persistent cohort of people with no formal qualifications
• Erosion of Indigenous communities
• Growing ageing rural population
• Greater attention on rights and status of women
• Increasing absence of children from public space and civil society
• Renewed interest in localism
• Continuing degradation on natural systems
• Increased militarisation
• Political transformation following devolution (Northern Ireland)
• Collapse in Socialism
• Technology accelerating the spread/extent of certain messages & single issues
• The role of public – private partnerships
• Increase need for the challenge function of civil society
• Declining sense of community
• Backlash against women’s equality (global)
• Gap between public and private sector in terms of providing services to meet changing household structures
• Increasing self responsibility for health
• Decreasing clarity on values and what gives meaning to life
**Appendix 3**

**List of Inquiry ‘drivers of change’ workshop participants and interviewees**

The Carnegie UK Trust and the Inquiry Commission are grateful to all who contributed to the Inquiry’s futures work. Please note that all informants were asked to contribute as individuals and not as representatives of any organisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Primary affiliation</th>
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<td>Catherine Corcoran</td>
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<td>Revolving Doors Agency</td>
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<td>Angharad Dalton</td>
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<td>Grahame Davies</td>
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<td>Mary Davis</td>
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Appendices
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<td>Brendan Mackin</td>
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<td>Maurice Mason</td>
<td>Ryan Academy for Entrepreneurship</td>
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<td>Sister Maura McCullen</td>
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<td>Cormac McAleer</td>
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<td>Frances McCandless</td>
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<td>Imelda McGrath</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Housing Executive</td>
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<td>James Maiden</td>
<td>Welsh Centre for International Affairs</td>
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<td>John McMurray</td>
<td>Paisley YMCA</td>
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<td>Duncan Munro</td>
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<td>Collette Murray</td>
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<td>Fidele Mutwarasibo</td>
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<td>Marie Navarro</td>
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<td>Welsh Refugee Council</td>
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<td>Martin O’Brien</td>
<td>Atlantic Philanthropies</td>
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<td>Liam O’Dwyer</td>
<td>Irish League of Credit Unions</td>
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<td>Joan O’Flynn</td>
<td>Combat Poverty</td>
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<td>Quintin Oliver</td>
<td>Stratagem</td>
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<td>John Osmond</td>
<td>Institute of Welsh Affairs</td>
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<td>Colleen Quinn</td>
<td>Nurture Development</td>
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<td>Brian Pearce</td>
<td>Interfaith Network UK</td>
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<td>Sean Pettis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jane Pitcher</td>
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<td>Jim Poole</td>
<td>Cynnal Cymru</td>
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<td>Kay Powell</td>
<td>Law Society</td>
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<td>Stephen Pittam</td>
<td>Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cormac Russell</td>
<td>Nurture Development</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Robert Rae  Scotland’s Future Forum
Paul Regan  London Citizens
Sean Regan  Community Workers Cooperative
George Reid  Scottish Parliament
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Tina Roche  Community Foundation Ireland
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Damien Walshe  Irish Traveller Movement
David Wilcox  Designing for Civil Society
Derick Wilson  UNESCO Centre, University of Ulster

We are also grateful to the contributions made by participants who attended the event co-hosted by the Inquiry and the National Council for Voluntary Organisations (a separate report documenting the findings of this event is available on the Inquiry website)
References and endnotes

16 She continued: There are individual men and women, and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look to themselves first.” Women’s Own, 31 October 1987.
17 A similar debate between ‘organising’ and ‘servicing’ has been prominent in trade union circles. Servicing refers to offering existing members more individualised services (healthcare, insurance, legal services) with their membership – hopefully making membership more attractive for non-members. Whereas organising emphasises identity and ideology as a means of developing active rather than consumerist/passive members.


21 To use the social capital jargon – diversity might mean that like ‘bond’ with like but to develop effective social capital these individuals and groups also need to ‘bridge’ or connect to other groups (multi-faith forums) and ‘link’ to power (state and market).

22 Peter Steiner, The New Yorker, 5 July, 1993 (Vol.69 (LXIX) no. 20)

23 In the pre-internet era Jonathan Raban explored this idea in his influential book Soft City (1974).


25 The Office of National Statistics estimates that 57% of UK households had internet access in the first quarter of 2006 (www.statistics.gov.uk/CCI/nugget.asp?ID=8). Rates of growth are slow. Other estimates (for example by the International Telecommunications Union) are slightly higher.

26 The term ‘digital natives’ was popularised by the games developer and consultant Marc Prensky. The metaphor of ‘immigrants’ and ‘natives’ was also used by other writers during the 1990s, such as John Perry Barlow and Douglas Rushkoff. See www.marcprensky.com/blog/archives/000045.html for Prensky’s discussion of the origin of the term.

27 www.cheese-rolling.co.uk (accessed 2 August 2007)/

28 Within a narrative, there are often feedback loops in which, for example, ‘consequence’ reinforce trends, and there are often connections between the different stories within each wheel.

29 It should be added that the futures’ wheels which follow in this section represent an attempt to synthesise the futures’ discussions that were held in each of the six drivers’ workshops. Inevitably they create an impression of greater order than the discussions in the workshops.


