"The Unequal use of the Global Commons" part 3

REGIME 1 - CARBON USAGE (IMPACT) ASSESSMENT

How its Done and Why

This calculation allocates "globally allowable carbon usage" (ie 40% of each year's actual global usage) to each nation on the basis of their populations, and compares this allocation with their actual usage to give a "debit" or "credit" figure.

Across the period 1950 - 1990, we also then calculated and compared: -

The curves for these are traced in the composite graphic below. The country's rankings are identified in a later graphic.

  1. Until the early 1980s, there was a clear majority of creditors over debitors (see centre graphic above). However, when per capita emissions in China went above the Sustainable Equitable Global Per Capita Impact Threshold (SEGPCIMT) in 1982, the country switched from being an "Impact Creditor" to being an "Impact Debitor". This explains why the relative numbers of debitors and creditors changed in this quota regime.
  2. The gross combined Impact (see middle graphic left hand column above) of debitors and creditors rose at over 2% per annum across the period split approximately 10:1 between debitors and creditors throughout.
  3. The average per capita Impacts (see middle graphic right hand column above) of debitors and creditors rose across the period until 1982, split approximately 10:1 throughout. China crossing SEGPCIMT caused both averages to fall thereafter. The average per capita Impact of the creditors was never more than half SEGPCIMT.
  4. The gross combined USD Income (see graphic top left hand corner above) values of the debitors and the creditors rose across the period and was split at more than 10:1 throughout.
  5. The average per capita USD Income (see graphic top right hand corner above) of creditors rose across the period until the early 1980's. The average per capita USD Income of creditors remained constant across the period overall and was never more than half the value of "sustainably derived income" (SDI - explained in regime 2). The split between creditors and debitors was on average 10:1 throughout.
  6. The average USD Efficiency of creditors and debitors, initially favouring creditors, converged over the period, with the global average rising slightly towards the end of the period. (See centre graphic top row above).
  7. The gross combined PPP Income values of the debitors and the creditors rose on average across the period and was split at less than 10:1 throughout. (See graphic bottom left hand corner above).
  8. The average per capita PPP Income (see graphic bottom right hand corner above) of debitors rose across the period until the early 1980's. The influence of China crossing SEGPCIMT caused the average to fall thereafter. The average per capita PPP Income of creditors rose across the period overall at the value of "sustainably derived income" (SDI). The differential split between creditors and debitors was roughly 10:1 until the early eighties at which time the debitor average fell causing temporary convergence.
  9. The average PPP Efficiency (see centre graphic bottom row above) of creditors and debitors, was always higher with the creditors, but converged over the period until the early 1980s. The global average rose slightly throughout the period with debitors always below this average.

The combined picture shows that the debitors' high per capita Income goes with high per capita Impact at low Efficiency values and that the creditors' low per capita Income goes with low per capita Impact at high Efficiency values. This is the basis of GCI's contention that - in the context of "understanding and responding to the unequal use of the global commons" - debitors live unsustainably and creditors live sustainably. Debitors do this by over-consuming global climate resources, both at the expense of and subsidised by, the creditors who do the opposite. In GCI's view the "credit" in any of these quota regimes represents a subsidy from the "creditors" to the "debitors".

Across the period 1950 - 1990 we also calculated and compared the curves traced in the graphic below: -

Had creditors accessed their full equitable share across the period, the debit curve would have been deeper by the amount registered as credit. It is this credit amount which represents the subsidy from the creditors to the debitors.

Click here to view a large graphic showing individual countries credit/debit rankings under this regime

REGIME 2 - US$ INCOME ASSESSMENT (BASED ON GLOBAL EFFICIENCY).

How its Done and Why

This calculation converts each nation's allowable carbon usage into a "sustainably derived income" (SDI), on the basis of the global annual average figure for the efficiency of carbon usage (ie units of GDP produced on average per unit of CO2 emitted). This allocation is then compared with each nation's actual income (GDP) to give a "debit" or "credit" figure.

Credit in this case means in any year the amount by which a nation fell short of its equitable share of SDI globally.

Because this calculation is based on the global average efficiency of carbon usage, nations capable of burning carbon at an average efficiency greater than the global average "lose out" on sustainably derived income under this system. This point is addressed in the PPP$ efficiency regime which follows.

Across the period 1950 1990, we also then calculated and compared: -

The curves for these are traced in the composite graphic below. The country's rankings are identified two pages forward.

Some of the Results

  1. There was an increasing majority of USD Income creditors over debitors. reaching 2:1 by 1990.
  2. The gross combined CO2 Impact (USD) (see middle graphic in left hand column on above) of debitors and creditors rose at over 2% per annum split approximately 10:1 overall.
  3. The average per capita Impacts (see middle graphic in right hand column above) of debitors and creditors rose throughout the period split on average 10:1 throughout. The average per capita Impact of the creditors was decreasingly less than SEGPCIMT.
  4. The gross combined USD Income (see graphic in top left hand corner above) of the debitors and the creditors rose across the period split at increasingly more than 10:1 throughout.
  5. The average per capita USD Income (see graphic top right hand corner above) of debitors rose across the entire period. The average per capita USD Income of creditors remained constant overall at increasingly less than half the value of "sustainably derived income" (SDI). The maldistribution between creditors' and debitors' Income seriously increased throughout.
  6. The average USD Efficiency (see top graphic in middle column above) of creditors and debitors, initially favouring creditors, reversed over the period, with debitors following the slightly rising global average towards the end of the period and creditors declining below the global average.
  7. The gross combined PPP Income (see graphic in bottom left hand corner above) values of the debitors and the creditors rose on average and the less than 10:1 initial split continued throughout.
  8. The average per capita PPP Income (see graphic bottom right hand corner above) of debitors rose while the average per capita PPP Income of creditors rose only to the threshold value of SDI. The split between creditors' and debitors' Income was less than 10:1.
  9. The average PPP Efficiency (see bottom graphic in middle column above) of creditors was always higher than the debitors. The global average rose slightly throughout the period with debitors always just below this average.

The combined picture - at least in PPP$ - shows that the debitors' high per capita Income goes with high per capita Impact at low Efficiency values and that the creditors' low per capita Income goes with low per capita Impact at high Efficiency values. The most striking point about this regime is that by the end of the period, two thirds of global population are creditors sharing 6% of global USD GDP, whilst the other one third are debitors sharing 94% of global USD GDP. It is in this context that "CO2 emissions trading" and "Joint Implementation" have been proposed in the name of "cost-effectiveness". However, while the US dollar remains the dominant currency in the enforced "global" market, the adverse systemic influence of this increasing maldistribution of global purchasing power and globally unequal consumption patterns would appear to invite conflict rather than the co-operation required by the suggested trading arrangements. Moreover, it cannot plausibly be argued in the context of ecological economics that such trade will be "cost-effective". In cash terms, the magnitude of the exiting debit outweighs the available credit by a factor of 4:1. A failure to re-establish ecological credit proportional to this overhang, simply commits the global system to a process of adapting to increasing risks and rising costs. As such, "cost-effective" (as used by the economists) in reality means not "benefit-effective"; - ie, it is not delivering "global benefit", it is delivering increased global cost or disbenefit (violating the requirements of the climate convention).

Across the period 1950 - 1990 we also calculated and compared the curves traced in the graphic below: -

OECD countries, with 19% of global population, were responsible for 99% of the accumulated USD Income debit.

click here to view a large graphic of individual countries credit/debit rankings under this regime (they have changed!)

REGIME 3 - PPP$ INCOME ASSESSMENT (BASED ON NATIONAL EFFICIENCY).

How its Done and Why

This calculation shows income (GDP) data expressed in "Purchasing Power Parity" (PPP) dollars. PPP$ delink national currencies from their US$ exchange rates, and value them instead for domestic purchasing power. This is more realistic basis for comparing economies internationally. [It is accepted as such by the IMF and other such institutions].

This calculation converts each nation's allowable carbon usage into a sustainably derived income (SDI), on the basis of the national (not global) figure for the efficiency of carbon usage (ie units of GDP produced on average per unit of CO2 emitted). This allocation is then compared with each nation's actual income (GDP) to give a "debit" or "credit" figure.

Because this calculation is based on the national efficiency averages of carbon usage, nations currently burning carbon at an average efficiency greater or less than the global average are respectively rewarded or penalised. The league table of countries is different from the league table arising out of the earlier impact and US$:CO2 income allocation regime (compare columns 1, 2 and 3 on pages 9 and 10).

Across the period 1950-1990, we also then calculated and compared: -

The curves for these are traced in the composite graphic below. The country's rankings are identified two pages forward.

Some of the Results

  1. As with the Impact, until the early 1980s, there was a 2:1 majority of creditors over debitors (see centre graphic above). However, with reference to the comparative country rankings pages 9 and 10, it will be seen that the order of countries in the league tables varies considerably between these three allocation regimes.
  2. As before, the gross combined Impact (see middle graphic in left hand column above) of debitors and creditors rose at over 2% per annum across the period. The initial differential was approximately 10:1 and this split increased over the period.
  3. The average per capita Impacts (see middle graphic in right hand column above) of debitors and creditors rose throughout the period until about 1980 and was split approximately 10:1 throughout. Thereafter both these averages fell. At the end of the period the average per capita Impact of the creditors was decreasingly less than half the value of SEGPCIMT.
  4. The gross combined USD Income (see graphic in top left hand corner above) of the debitors and the creditors rose across the period and was split at increasingly more than 10:1 throughout.
  5. The average per capita USD Income (see graphic in top right hand corner above) of debitors rose across the period until the early 1980's. The average per capita USD Income of creditors remained constant at less than half the value of SDI. The split between creditors' and debitors' Income widened overall.
  6. The average USD Efficiency (see top graphic in middle column above) of creditors and debitors, initially favouring creditors, reversed over the period, with debitors following the slightly rising global average and creditors recovering slightly towards the end of the period.
  7. The gross combined PPP Income (see graphic in bottom left hand corner above) of the debitors and the creditors rose on average for most of the period. But the initial split widened throughout.
  8. The average per capita PPP Income (see graphic bottom right hand corner above) of debitors rose until the 1980s at which point it fell as the number of debitors increased. The average per capita PPP Income of creditors rose across the period at the SDI threshold value. The differential split between creditors' and debitors' Income diverged overall with temporary convergence towards the end.
  9. The average PPP Efficiency (see bottom graphic in middle column above) of creditors and debitors, was always higher with the creditors, but converged and then diverged over the period. The global average rose slightly throughout the period with debitors always slightly below this average.

The combined picture shows that the debitors' high per capita Income goes with high per capita Impact at low Efficiency values and that the creditors' low per capita Income goes with low per capita Impact at high Efficiency values. The point about this quota regime is that using the domestic purchasing power (PPP$) of the countries is a more realistic way of measuring their relative wealth and their provision of global benefit or disbenefit. Using PPP$ from the outset of the calculations is a more realistic way of measuring their relative socio-ecological efficiencies (PPP$:CO2) and it is these efficiencies which should be rewarded.

Across the period 1950 - 1990 we also calculated and compared the curves in the graphic below.: -

OECD countries, representing 19% of global population, were responsible for 1635% % of accumulated USD Income debit.

The ROW provided an accumulated 1735% of accumulated credit.

click here to view a large graphic of individual countries rankings under this regime (changed again).

You can also see the vaules of impact / income / efficiency for all countries, in a large table

View top half/ bottom half

Continue to next section: Conclusion: "spotted owls and the economics of genocide"

Return to Contents

Return to GCI home page